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Whether examined in the context of what is happening in the nation's
courtrooms or in the arena of public opinion and legislative action, many
indicators suggest that the death penalty in America is on the ropes. In the
courtroom, death sentences have been in a steady nationwide decline for the
past ten years even though the capital murder rate has remained relatively
constant.1 Indeed, the years 2004 and 2005 saw the lowest number of annual
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1. Thomas P. Bonczar & Tracy L. Snell, Capital Punishment, 2004, BUREAU JUST. STAT.
BULL., Nov. 2005, at 14 app. tbl.2 [hereinafter Bonczar & Snell, Capital Punishment, 2004],
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp04.pdf. Although the overall homicide rate has
declined significantly during this time, the capital murder rate in states with the death penalty has
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death sentences imposed since 1973.2 The 125 new death sentences handed
down in each of those years constitute a 61% drop from a post-Furman high
of 317 death sentences imposed in 1996. 3
On a more general level, opinion polls show some erosion in support for
the death penalty among the public, from a high of 80% in a September 1994
Gallup poll to 64% in Gallup's October 2005 poll.4 Moreover, qualms are
appearing within the institutions of state governments, with the New Jersey
legislature recently enacting a moratorium 5 and the New York legislature
declining to re-enact the death penalty after the existing statute was ruled
unconstitutional by the New York Court of Appeals.6 The Massachusetts
House of Representatives voted 100-53 against a bill to bring back the death
remained relatively stable, generally ranging each year between one and two capital murders per
100,000 population. Jeffrey Fagan, Franklin E. Zimring & Amanda Geller, Capital Punishment and
Capital Murder: Market Share and the Deterrent Effects of the Death Penalty, 84 TEXAS L. REV.
1803, 1824-26 (2006). The decline in the overall homicide rate has occurred primarily in the area
of noncapital homicides. Id.
2. See Bonczar & Snell, Capital Punishment, 2004, supra note 1, at 8 (indicating that the
number of new death sentences in 2004 (125) was the lowest recorded since 1973); Press Release,
Am. Judicature Soc'y, National Jury Center Reports 139, Death Sentences in 2005 (March 27,
2006), available at http://www.ajs.org/include/story.asp?contentid=478 (reporting that 125 new
sentences were imposed in 2005).
3. Bonczar & Snell, Capital Punishment, 2004, supra note 1, at 14 app. tbl.2. Because Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), struck down all existing death penalty statutes and created the
need to pass the statutes that are the basis today for imposing the death penalty, the case is seen as
marking the beginning of the modem era of capital punishment.
The 61% drop in annual death sentences considerably outpaced the 18% fall in annual murders
over a similar time period (1996 to 2004). See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE, at tbl.6.79.2004 (Ann L. Pastore
& Kathleen Maguire eds., 2004), http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t6792004.pdf (reporting
19,645 murders occurred in 1996 and 16,137 in 2004). Even when the decline in the number of
murders is measured against the year with the most murders (24,703 in 1991), the 35% decline in
annual murders is far less than the 61% drop in annual death sentences from its high in 1996. See
id.; Bonczar & Snell, Capital Punishment, 2004, supra note 1, at 14 app. tbl.2. Moreover, the drop
in homicides during this time period was primarily in the area of noncapital homicides; the capital
murder rate, by contrast, remained fairly steady, Fagan et al., supra note 1, at 1829, producing a
relatively constant pool of death penalty-eligible defendants from which fewer defendants have
been sentenced to death each year.
For a further discussion of the relationship between the homicide rate and the rate of imposition
of the death penalty, see Carol S. Steiker, Capital Punishment and American Exceptionalism, 81
OR. L. REV. 97, 102-07 (2002) (examining the thesis that death penalty use depends on the
homicide rate and concluding that "high homicide rates are neither necessary nor sufficient for the
formal retention or vigorous use of capital punishment, and that low homicide rates are neither
necessary nor sufficient for its abolition or more modest use").
4. Lydia Saad, Support for Death Penalty Steady at 64%, THE GALLUP POLL TUESDAY
BRIEFING, Dec. 2005, at 9, 9.
5. Death Penalty Suspension Tops Busy Day, DAILY J. (Vineland, N.J.), Jan. 10, 2006, at A5.
The bill passed 55-21 in the Assembly and 30-6 in the Senate. Id.
6. People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341, 356-68 (N.Y. 2004) (ruling that New York's "deadlock
instruction"-which required judges to advise sentencing juries that failure to agree on a unanimous
sentence of death or life without parole would result in a parole-eligible sentence-was
unconstitutional); Michael Powell, In N.Y., Lawmakers Vote Not to Reinstate Capital Punishment:
Accidental Execution of the Innocent Cited, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2005, at A3.
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penalty under a statute that proponents had argued would be the "gold
standard" for capital punishment by reducing the risk of wrongful
executions.7
Yet while those favoring abolition of the death penalty understandably
take heart from this trend, there are reasons to be cautious in extrapolating
too far and too fast from these figures. At various other moments in our his-
tory the United States has appeared to be at a crossroads over the use of
capital punishment, only to continue down the death penalty path in the end.8
As recently as the 1960s and early '70s, for instance, public support had
fallen below 500/o--indeed for a brief moment more Americans opposed
capital punishment than favored it9-and the number of annual death sen-
tences had dwindled even more dramatically than this past decade's
decline.' 0 But by the mid-1970s public support for the death penalty had
risen back above 60%," and the number of annual death sentences rose
steadily from 1977 to 1996,12 evidencing an upward trend that statistically
appeared as unstoppable as the downward trend of the past ten years appears
now. 13
Sounding this word of caution is not to argue that the death penalty is a
permanent fixture on America's punishment landscape. Indeed, this Article
will conclude that forces are at work that ultimately may spell the end for the
death penalty in the United States. The road to abolition, however, is likely
7. Scott Helman, Death Penalty Bill Fails in House; Romney Initiative Roundly Defeated,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 16, 2005, at B1, available at 2005 WLNR 18511109 ("[T]he decisive
outcome underscores how capital punishment has lost support among [Massachusetts] state
lawmakers since it was a hotly contested issue in the 1980s and 1990s."). See generally
Symposium, Toward a Model Death Penalty Code: The Massachusetts Governor's Council Report,
80 IND. L.J. 1 (2005) (discussing the merits of the proposed Massachusetts statute).
8. STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 208, 267 (2003) (stating
that despite the decline in capital punishment that occurred during the first half of the twentieth
century, "[b]y the end of the twentieth century capital punishment [was] back with a vengeance");
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Should Abolitionists Support Legislative "Reform" of the
Death Penalty?, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 417, 419 (2002) (discussing how the temporary moratorium on
the death penalty imposed by the 1972 Supreme Court decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972), was followed by the reinstitution of the death penalty pursuant to the 1976 decision in
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)).
9. THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1986, at 57 (George Gallup, Jr. ed., 1987).
10. The nation's death rows grew by an average of only fifteen inmates a year between 1960
and 1965. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Key Facts at a Glance: Prisoners on Death Row,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/tables/drtab.htm.
11. THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1986, supra note 9, at 57.
12. See Bonczar & Snell, Capital Punishment, 2004, supra note 1, at 14 app. tbl.2 (charting
admissions to and removals from death sentences between 1977 and 2004).
13. See id. Carol and Jordan Steiker have suggested with "gloomy irony" that the abolition
efforts directed at the Supreme Court through use of the Eighth Amendment during the Furman
period may in fact have provided legitimacy to the death penalty and "helped to stabilize and
entrench the practice of capital punishment in the United States." Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M.
Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of
Capital Punishment, 109 HARv. L. REV. 355, 360 (1995).
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to be more complicated and rocky at both the courtroom and public opinion
levels than a simple linear extrapolation of recent trends might suggest. At
the courtroom level, for example, while there has been a steady drop in the
number of death sentences over the past decade, it is uncertain how much
further the decline will go without significant developments, such as forensic
proof that an innocent person has been executed. Similarly, while it is true
that public support for the death penalty has waned slightly since the mid-
1990s, approximately two out of every three Americans continue to voice
approval of capital punishment,' 4 making it unlikely that public opposition
will lead to widespread legislative repeals of the death penalty without fur-
ther catalysts coming into play.
This Article argues, therefore, that what has occurred over the past
decade with the death penalty requires a more nuanced understanding than
simply assuming that the decline in annual death sentences reflects a gradual
and inexorable erosion in support for the death penalty that eventually will
lead to its abolition. Plausible scenarios exist that would make the abolition
of the death penalty possible,' 5 but it seems unlikely that the death penalty
will end simply because an unstoppable downward momentum toward fewer
death sentences has developed. An exploration of the reasons for the decline
in death sentences over the past decade, therefore, not only sheds light on the
current state of capital punishment, but also helps to identify those factors
that are likely to determine the future course of the death penalty in America.
I. Thinking Small About the Decline in Death Sentences
The past decade's decline in death sentences has understandably
triggered speculation that capital punishment as an institution is in a state of
decay. 16 A declining number of death sentences can also have important le-
gal consequences, because the Supreme Court has used jury behavior as a
"significant and reliable objective index of contemporary values" in assess-
ing whether a particular use of the death penalty violates the Eighth
Amendment ban on "cruel and unusual punishments." 17
Before exploring the possible causes for the decline in death sentences,
however, it is important to note two major difficulties in confidently making
general predictions and statements about how the death penalty is being
14. Saad, supra note 4, at 9.
15. See infra Part III.
16. Newspaper headlines often try to capture this speculation in the wording of their headlines.
See, e.g., Editorial, The Death of the Death Penalty?, NAPA VALLEY REG., Feb. 26, 2006,
http://www.napavalleyregister.com/articles/2006/02/26/opinion/editorial/iq_3315425.txt; David
Greenberg, The Unkillable Death Penalty: DNA Tests Won't Stop Capital Punishment, SLATE, June
2, 2000, http://www.slate.com/id/83569/; Robert Tharp, Death Penalty Losing Capital, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Dec. 29, 2005, at IA; Benjamin Wittes, The Executioner's Swan Song?,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 2005, at 42.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977).
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implemented as a contemporary practice. First, the pool of cases involving
the death penalty is a relatively small one, especially when considered in the
context of the entire criminal justice system. Even in 1996, when death sen-
tences reached their post-Furman high-water mark, the 317 capital sentences
that were imposed constituted only a fraction of the sentences handed down
for all murder convictions that year.18 And because the numbers are rela-
tively small in absolute terms, a drop or rise of even two to three death
sentences in an individual state can produce misleading statistics. In
Virginia, for instance, an observer could accurately report that death
sentences dropped a full 25% in the single year between 2001 and 2002, only
to double in number from 2002 to 2003, before plummeting by two-thirds in
2004.19 Yet in absolute numbers, the annual total of death sentences in
Virginia between 2001 and 2004 was relatively stable, ranging from a high of
six death sentences in 2003 to a low of two death sentences in 2004.20 Thus,
while on a nationwide basis a distinctive downward trend in death sentences
can be discerned over the past decade, care must be exercised in making con-
clusions about long-term trends and causes, especially when looking at
individual states, given the relatively small statistical base involved.
A second complicating factor is that a death sentence results only after a
lengthy process involving numerous actors responding to a wide variety of
factors. This is not a novel observation; since the Supreme Court's decision
in Gregg v. Georgia,21 the multiplicity of actors and factors involved in a
18. The Bureau of Justice Statistics reported 8,564 sentences for state murder convictions in
1996 (excluding manslaughter convictions). BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, STATE COURT SENTENCING OF CONVICTED FELONS, 1996, at 3 (1997), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/scscf96.pdf. The 315 death sentences handed down in 1996
at the state level (two death sentences that year were at the federal level) therefore constituted
3.67% of all sentences for murder handed down that year at the state level. Bonczar & Snell,
Capital Punishment, 2004, supra note 1, at 14 app. tbl.2. In addition to the actual number of death
sentences declining since 1996, the death penalty rate when compared to all murder sentences also
has dropped. In 2002, for instance, the 154 state death sentences constituted 2.39% of all (6,430)
state sentences for the crime of murder compared to the 3.67% in 1996. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT SENTENCING OF CONVICTED FELONS, 2002, at 5
(2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.govbjs/pub/pdf/scscf02.pdf, Thomas P. Bonczar & Tracy
L. Snell, Capital Punishment, 2002, BUREAU JUST. STAT. BULL., Nov. 2003, at 4 [hereinafter
Bonczar & Snell, Capital Punishment, 2002], available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp02.pdf.
.19. See Bonczar & Snell, Capital Punishment, 2004, supra note 1, at 5 tbl.4 (reporting two new
death sentences); Thomas P. Bonczar & Tracy L. Snell, Capital Punishment, 2003, BUREAU JUST.
STAT. BULL., Nov. 2004, at 5 tbl.4 [hereinafter Bonczar & Snell, Capital Punishment, 2003],
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp03.pdf (reporting six new death sentences);
Bonczar & Snell, Capital Punishment, 2002, supra note 18, at 5 tbl.4 (reporting three new death
sentences); Tracy L. Snell & Laura M. Maruschak, Capital Punishment 2001, BUREAU JUST. STAT.
BULL., Dec. 2002, at 6 tbl.5, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp0l.pdf (reporting
four new death sentences in Virginia).
20. See supra note 19.
21. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 & n.50 (1976) (rejecting the petitioner's argument
that continuing practices-such as the prosecutor's exercise of discretion-still allowed the death
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capital sentence has served as the basis for an ongoing constitutional objec-
tion that the criminal justice system contains too many opportunities for
arbitrary and capricious discretion.22 Beyond the constitutional objection that
arises from such widespread discretion, however, the existence of so many
actors responding to differing incentives also considerably complicates the
effort to gain a clear picture of what factors are influencing the death sen-
tence rate. A prosecutor in any one case, for example, may decide to not
pursue a death sentence for a variety of reasons: the victim's survivors might
not support the death penalty; the cost of pursuing the case as a capital crime
might be too great; the defendant might be willing to plead guilty in ex-
change for a life sentence; the defendant might reveal important information
in return for a life sentence; or some combination of these and other reasons
might exist. 3
In similar fashion, a variety of factors can influence whether a jury in
any one case decides for or against the death penalty, such as the strength of
the defendant's mitigating evidence, the defense attorneys' skill, the victim's
role in the crime, the articulateness of the victim's mother, or the racial com-
position of the jury. And, of course, numerous other actors-including the
judge, the defense lawyers, the victim's survivors, expert witnesses, and the
media-will influence the course of a capital case, starting from the pretrial
stage and extending through the post-conviction process.
Discerning cause and effect with death sentence rates, therefore, is
tricky both because the death penalty decision-making process is a very
complex one (in that so many actors and factors are at work) and because
penalty to be applied in an arbitrary and capricious fashion and calling the argument "nothing more
than a veiled contention that Furman indirectly outlawed capital punishment by placing totally
unrealistic conditions on its use").
22. See, e.g., DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 399-401
(1990) (concluding that "[p]rosecutorial discretion continues to dominate the system and... only a
small portion of the death-eligible cases actually result in a death sentence" and that "defendants
with white victims face average odds of receiving a death sentence that are 4.3 times larger than
those faced by similarly situated defendants with black victims").
23. Several recent high-profile cases provide a sense of the reasons why a prosecutor might
accept a guilty plea in return for not pursuing a death sentence. In the case of Eric Rudolph, who
had committed the 1996 bombing at the Atlanta Olympic games as well as attacks on abortion
climics and a gay nightclub, prosecutors stated that they accepted a plea rather than pursuing the
death penalty because of a fear that Rudolph might become a "martyr," as well as the fact that
Rudolph had agreed to reveal where he had hidden 250 pounds of dynamite. See Tom Regan, Eric
Rudolph- "American Terrorist, " CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 15, 2005,
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0415/dailyUpdate.html. In the notorious "Green River" and
"Killer Nurse" cases, the prosecutors in each case cited the need to obtain information about the
serial killer's many victims in justifying the negotiation of life sentences. See Jeffrey Gentleman,
Nurse nho Killed 29 Is Sentenced to 11 Life Terms, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2006, at B2 (reporting that
prosecutors agreed to life sentences in return for Cullen's revealing which patients he had killed
with hard-to-detect drug injections); Gene Johnson, Green River Killer Given Life in Prison, WASH.
POST, Dec. 19, 2003, at A4 (reporting that prosecutors agreed to let Gary Ridgway, the "Green
River" killer, avoid the death penalty in return for helping to locate and identify the remains of his
forty-eight victims).
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imposing a capital sentence is a case-specific decision that is highly depend-
ent on the facts of each case. Moreover, given the relatively small number of
death sentences, a factor that may influence only a handful of cases can have
a significant proportional impact on the number of death sentences that
result. For instance, assuming a steady pool of capital eligible cases from
2005 to 2006, if in 2006 five more local prosecutors decide not to pursue
death sentences because of budgetary concerns, three additional juries vote
for life because of heightened concerns over wrongful convictions, and five
more cases result in life sentences because the defense attorneys are better
trained at presenting the defendant's case for life, the number of death sen-
tences from 2005 to 2006 would drop a full ten percent (from 125 to 112
death sentences). 24 In other words, the current number of death sentences
being imposed is at such a low level that a factor which tips only a small
number of cases nationwide from death to life can be viewed as a significant
factor in explaining a decline in the death sentencing rate. At the same time,
because the numbers are so small, trying to empirically identify such factors
(especially when any one death penalty decision is the result of a complex
interaction of factors) is extremely challenging. The following analysis sur-
veys a number of factors that might be at work based on recent discoveries
about capital jury behavior 25 and other developments in capital punishment.
What emerges is an analysis suggesting that the decline in death sentences
cannot be attributed to any single factor, but is likely the result of the conver-
gence of a number of influences.
A. The Jury at the Threshold of Decision-Making: Understanding Each
Jury as Its Own Microsystem
When looking at case outcomes in the aggregate, the tendency is to
think of the final verdict as the product of a monolithic entity, the jury. This
monolithic perspective, in turn, encourages thinking on the macro level and
looking for blockbuster circumstances that explain why twelve jurors at a
time will decide whether a life or a death sentence is the proper verdict. Fo-
cusing on these blockbuster factors is misguided, however, because most
capital juries reach their verdicts only after considerable deliberation in
which individual jurors must be persuaded to join the majority until
24. See Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Death Sentences in the United States from 1977 to 2005,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=9&did=847 (reporting 125 death sentences in
2005).
25. Unless otherwise indicated, any jury data in this Article is from the California segment of
the Capital Jury Project, for which the author served as the Principal Investigator. The data for this
Article was gathered by interviewing jurors from thirty-seven cases in which the death penalty was
sought. Nineteen of the cases resulted in an imposition of a death sentence, seventeen led to a
sentence of life without parole (LWOP), and one ended in a hung jury over the penalty. Each juror
participated in an interview that on average lasted three to four hours, answering questions designed
to elicit both quantitative and qualitative data regarding how his or her jury deliberated and what
factors influenced his or her decision.
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unanimity is reached.26 It is important, therefore, to think on the micro level
and recognize that an issue or factor that might influence only a handful of
individual jurors can affect how a capital jury deliberates as a whole and
reaches the final verdict.
This need to think about the jury as a collection of individuals becomes
especially crucial once attention is focused on what factors might be leading
juries to return more life sentences. The heightened importance arises be-
cause of a critical finding by Professors Eisenberg, Garvey, and Wells about
capital jury behavior: it takes significantly fewer votes on the first ballot to
secure a life sentence than a death sentence.27 If the defense is able to secure
five votes for "life" or "undecided" on the first ballot, the result is almost
invariably a life sentence; 28 indeed, in some instances, as few as four votes
for "life" or "undecided" can still result in a life sentence. 29  By contrast,
unless at least eight jurors vote for death on the first ballot, there is hardly
any possibility that the jury will return a death sentence,3Y and a death sen-
tence is assured only if at least nine jurors vote for death on the first ballot. 31
These findings are good news for defense attorneys because it means that to
obtain a life sentence they need to gain only five votes for life at the outset of
the jury's deliberations and will have a chance at a life sentence even if as
few as four jurors are for life on the first ballot.32
These findings, however, are not simply encouraging news for capital
defense attorneys. They also emphasize the necessity of "thinking small"
when looking for factors that might be leading juries to return life sentences
when in the past they would have returned a death sentence. Because only
five votes are needed for a life sentence (and sometimes as few as four), such
a factor need not be of such a magnitude that it will change the minds of
26. In the South Carolina segment of the Capital Jury Project, only nine of fifty-three juries
(17%) were unanimous on the first vote. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Forecasting Life and Death:
Juror Race, Religion, and Attitude Toward the Death Penalty, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 303 (2001).
The rate of unanimity was even lower among the California juries that were studied, with only three
of thirty-seven cases (8%) reporting unanimity on the first ballot. See supra note 25.
27. See Eisenberg et al., supra note 26, at 304 ("Death verdicts are therefore relatively more
difficult to orchestrate [than life verdicts].").
28. See id. at 303 tbl.7 (reporting that in the twenty-one South Carolina cases in which fewer
than two-thirds ofjurors voted for death on the first ballot, none resulted in a death sentence).
29. See id. Of the eleven South Carolina cases the authors studied that had eight votes for death
on the first ballot, seven came back death and four came back life. Id. A key factor in this band of
cases appeared to be whether those jurors not voting for death were voting "life" or "undecided."
Id. at 304 n.91.
30. Id. at 303 tbl.7.
31. Id.
32. For instance, in the trial of Lee Boyd Malvo---one of the snipers who terrorized
Washington, D.C. and the surrounding area in the fall of 2002-jurors described how a "core
group" of four individuals who favored life were eventually able to bring the entire jury to a life
sentence even though some of the other jurors had strongly favored a death sentence. Tom
Jackman, Death Penalty Deliberations Tore Malvo Jury Apart, WASH. POST, June 19, 2004, at B5.
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twelve jurors, or eight jurors, or even half the jury, to have a potentially sig-
nificant effect. In fact, given that juries that voted for death were rarely
unanimous on the first ballot and often had two or three votes for life, a fac-
tor need not even affect four or five jurors to have an impact. If a factor
merely increases the chances that an additional one or two jurors on any one
jury are likely to vote for life or "undecided," the factor can have a signifi-
cant impact on the aggregate of cases.
The search, therefore, is not for new earth-shattering factors that are
turning large percentages of capital jurors toward a life sentence, but for what
might be called "tipping factors"--factors that are now tipping one or two
members of a jury toward voting for "life" (or at least "undecided") who be-
fore might have been inclined to vote for death on the first ballot.33 These
"tipped" jurors, if coupled with two or three jurors who already would have
been voting for life, can shift an entire jury that in previous years would have
gone death.34 A number of possible factors might play this tipping role and
provide insight into the reasons why juries may be more reluctant to return
death sentences than in the past.
1. Rising Residual Doubt?-One of the explanations most frequently
forwarded to explain the drop in death sentences is the increased public
awareness of the number of inmates on death rows who have been
exonerated by DNA evidence. 35 Governor Ryan's high-profile emptying of
Illinois's death row, increasing legislative support for moratoria, and the
growing number of commutations based on concerns over innocence have
added governmental legitimacy to the concern that there is a significant risk
that innocent persons are being executed. Opinion polls indicate that the les-
son has not been lost on the public. In a 2005 Gallup poll, almost six out of
ten Americans stated that they believed an innocent person had been exe-
cuted within the previous five years.36
33. See Eisenberg et al., supra note 26, at 303-04 (identifying the eighth vote for death on the
first ballot as "the tipping point" for whether a jury will end up with a death sentence); cf
MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: How LITrLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE
7-8 (2002) (discussing how certain self-replicating behavior can quickly cause dramatic change in
society).
34. Cf John H. Blume et al., Probing "Life Qualification" Through Expanded Voir Dire, 29
HOFSTRA L. REv. 1209, 1220-21 (2001) (observing based on the South Carolina study that "[t]he
final outcome swings precipitously on a difference of only two votes" given that nine votes for
death essentially guarantees a death sentence, but if only seven votes are cast for death, a life
sentence almost always follows).
35. See, e.g., Mike Chalmers, Jurors Less Likely to Vote for Execution: Exonerations Based on
DNA Evidence Turned Tide Since 1990s, NEWS J. (Wilmington, Del.), Jan. 12, 2006, at IA
(reporting the opinion of certain observers who trace a decline in support for the death penalty to the
exoneration of high profile death row inmates).
36. Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans' Views of Death Penalty More Positive This Year, THE
GALLUP POLL TUESDAY BRIEFING, May 2005, at 104, 105 [hereinafter Jones, Americans' Views].
In a 2003 Gallup poll the figure was even higher, with close to three-quarters (73%) of respondents
2006] 1937
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The public's recognition of the problem of wrongful convictions no
doubt helps to explain the growing support for a moratorium on the death
penalty.37 The question of how this generalized concern translates in the jury
room, however, is a more difficult one. It may very well be, as anecdotal
evidence suggests, that the concern over wrongful convictions, when coupled
with what is popularly dubbed the "CSI effect," 38 will make juries less
inclined to convict defendants for a crime without forensic evidence. More
acquittals at the guilt phase of death-eligible crimes would, of course, affect
the number of death sentences, assuming that these are the types of cases in
which prosecutors would have sought the death penalty and juries would
have returned a death verdict.
Once beyond the guilt phase, though, the effect of the wrongful
conviction phenomenon becomes even more subtle and speculative. Capital
Jury Project research has found that while jurors are aware of the general
problem of wrongful convictions and hypothetically offer "residual doubt" as
one of the most powerful reasons why they would vote for a life sentence,
very few jurors actually believe that the risk of wrongful conviction existed
in their own case 39 (a phenomenon perhaps analogous to polls that show re-
spondents do not trust politicians generally but think that their own
representative is the exception to the rule). As the number of exonerations
continues to rise over time, it may be that more jurors will come to worry
that their jury made a mistake in convicting the defendant, and residual doubt
will lead them to affirmatively advocate a life sentence. 40  At present,
however, once jurors have convicted a defendant of capital murder they do
not appear inclined to either individually or collectively revisit their decision
at the sentencing phase; in fact, capital jurors sometimes react with
indignation when asked if they had any "residual doubts" at the sentencing
believing that an innocent person had been executed in the previous five years. Jeffrey M. Jones,
Support for the Death Penalty Remains High at 74%, THE GALLUP POLL TUESDAY BRIEFING, May
2003, at 28, 29.
37. See infra notes 148-53 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Richard Willing, "CSI Effect" Has Juries Wanting More Evidence, USA TODAY,
Aug. 5, 2004, at 1A (reporting how lawyers believe that juries increasingly want forensic evidence
before convicting). But see Kimberlianne Podlas, "The CSI Effect": Exposing the Media Myth, 16
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 429 (2006) (reporting a study of jury-eligible adults
that showed no significant difference between those who watched CSI and those who did not);
Simon Cole & Rachel Dioso, Law and the Lab: Do TV Shows Really Affect How Juries Vote? Let's
Look at the Evidence, WALL ST. J., May 13, 2005, at W13 ("[T]o argue that 'C.S.I.' and similar
shows are actually raising the number of acquittals is a staggering claim, and the remarkable thing is
that, speaking forensically, there is not a shred of evidence to back it up. There is a robust field of
research on jury decision-making but no study finding any 'C.S.I. effect.').
39. See Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial Strategy,
Remorse and the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1557, 1577-78 (1998) (reporting that few
jurors have residual doubt in the sentencing stage).
40. Ongoing studies by the Capital Jury Project, investigating the way capital juries operate,
should help in identifying any such development.
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stage, insisting that they never would have convicted the defendant in the
first place if they had harbored such doubts.4 '
While a rise in residual doubt among jurors does not appear to play the
blockbuster role that is often attributed to it in explaining the wholesale
decline in death sentences, the possible effects of the wrongful conviction
phenomenon in the jury room should not be totally discounted. Keeping in
mind that a factor can trigger more life sentences even if it affects only one
or two jurors, it is possible that accounts of wrongful convictions are causing
a few jurors who before might have voted for death on the first ballot to act
more cautiously and instead initially vote for "life" or "undecided." Jurors
sometimes report, for example, that they voted "undecided" or "life" on the
first ballot because of a general unease about deciding the defendant's fate;
the wrongful conviction problem might be increasing the number of such
jurors who are hesitant to vote for death on the first ballot. If this is
happening, it is possible that even a slight upward trend in the number of
such "caution votes" on the first ballot, when combined with the votes of
several other jurors already favoring life, might be putting more juries across
the first-ballot threshold necessary to trigger a life sentence. In this way, a
growing awareness of the problem of wrongful convictions could be causing
some juries to return life sentences that in the past would have voted for
death.42
The wrongful conviction phenomenon, therefore, may be influencing
the death sentencing rate, albeit in a more subtle fashion than often is
supposed. It also should be noted, however, that the wrongful conviction
problem-if misunderstood by defense lawyers-could actually increase the
odds of a death sentence in certain types of cases. The Capital Jury Project
has found that a guilt-phase defense that tries to argue complete innocence in
the face of strong evidence of guilt actually increases the chances that the
jury will return a death sentence.43 Consequently, if lawyers begin banking
41. Sundby, supra note 39, at 1557, 1577-85. Only 5% of jurors stated that they had even
entertained the "thought" that the defendant might be completely innocent. Id. at 1578 n.48. By
contrast, jurors were far more likely to express lingering doubts about specific aspects of the crime
such as the defendant's intent or level of participation. Id. at 1584-85 & n.65.
42. It is also quite possible that where the jury is divided over the proper sentence, the life
jurors can effectively use even the remote possibility of an erroneous conviction as a wedge
argument to persuade death holdouts to settle for a sentence of life without parole. In most cases,
though, such an argument is likely only to hasten the crossover of those jurors favoring death who
are beginning to realize that insufficient jury support exists to obtain a death sentence anyway. In
other words, the jury's discussion of the possibility of a wrongful conviction may serve more as a
vehicle for jurors favoring life to provide a rationale for death holdouts to join the majority, rather
than as an independent reason that sways a jury that otherwise would vote for death.
43. Sundby, supra note 39, at 1574-83; see also Theodore Eisenberg et al., But Was He Sorry?
The Role of Remorse in Capital Sentencing, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1599, 1614-16 (1998) (noting
that defendants who deny any culpability or role in the crime have more trouble convincing the jury
of their remorse at the sentencing phase); cf Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 178-79 (2004)
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on jurors' concerns over a wrongful conviction as a reason to try and create
"residual doubt" where evidence of guilt is strong, the wrongful conviction
phenomenon could cause some cases to go death that if presented differently
to the jury might have resulted in a life sentence.
2. More Representative Juries.-The importance of thinking about
capital juries in terms of individual jurors is dramatically highlighted when
attention is turned to the role of the jury's racial composition. A recent study
by Professor Bowers and his colleagues made the eye-opening discovery that
in cases involving an African American defendant accused of killing a white
victim, the seating of a single African American male dramatically reduced
the likelihood that the jury would return a death sentence; juries with one
African American male juror returned death sentences in 42.9% of such
cases-a far lower rate than the 71.9% of the cases where no African
American males were on the jury.44
The Bowers study found that the difference in the death sentence rate
reflects the fact that male African American jurors (and to a lesser extent
female African American jurors) were more likely than whites to perceive
the evidence in a manner supportive of those factors that lead jurors to vote
for life sentences: they were more likely to see the defendant as remorseful,
to believe that the defendant's background had adversely influenced his life,
to have lingering doubts about the defendant's role in the crime, and to be-
lieve that the defendant did not pose a future danger if given a life sentence.45
These differences in perception existed in all cases, but were particularly no-
ticeable when an African American defendant was accused of killing a white
victim, 46 the category of cases that research has consistently identified as
raising the gravest concerns about racial discrimination in the death
penalty.47
The Bowers study's findings suggest, therefore, that one key
explanation for the decline in death sentences may be greater diversity of
racial representation on capital juries. This hypothesis may at first seem to
ignore reality given the well-documented problems with obtaining petit juries
(finding that a lawyer's strategy of conceding guilt to increase the chances of avoiding a death
sentence did not necessarily violate the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel).
44. William J. Bowers et al., Death Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical Analysis of
the Role of Jurors' Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 171, 193-94 (2001).
Also important was the independent effect of the number of white males on the jury. Cases
involving a black-on-white killing that had four or fewer white males on the jury returned a death
sentence in 30% of the cases, but if the jury included five or more white males the chances of a
death sentence increased "dramatically," with 70.7% of such cases resulting in death sentences. Id.
at 193.
45. Id. at 215-26.
46. Id. at 241-44.
47. Id. at 259-66; see BALDUS ET AL., supra note 22, at 159 (noting that the presence of a
racially antagonistic motive in cases with a white victim and an African American defendant
increased the likelihood of a death sentence).
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that are racially representative. Batson v. Kentucky,48 for instance, has
widely been criticized as a failed remedy for eliminating discriminatory per-
emptory strikes,4 9 and studies have found that jury pools continue to under-
represent minorities.5°
In the very specific context of looking for factors that help explain the
drop in the number of death sentences, however, even an imperfect cure for
the problem of minority under-representation on juries can have a significant
effect. If defense attorneys' use of Batson over the past decade has led to the
inclusion of a single African American male on even a portion of juries that
otherwise might have been all white, the Bowers study's finding suggests
that some cases will have gone life that would otherwise have gone death. 1
And while Batson may have fallen far short of completely ending the dis-
criminatory use of peremptory challenges, it has very likely kept prosecutors
in at least some capital cases from engaging in wholesale exclusion of
African American jurors because of concerns over reversal.52 Likewise,
48. 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (allowing defendants to prove purposeful discrimination by the
prosecution in peremptory challenges).
49. See People v. Randall, 671 N.E.2d 60, 65-66 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (describing the "Batson
process" as a "charade"). See generally Albert W. Alshuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir
Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 153 (1989)
(noting that the Batson decision has created procedural burdens on litigation and has led to other
forms of discrimination in peremptory challenges); David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory
Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3
(2001) (using a study of Philadelphia murder trials to reveal persistent racial and gender
discrimination in peremptory challenges despite Batson).
50. See, e.g., PA. SUPREME COURT COMM'N, FINAL REPORT ON RACIAL AND GENDER BIAS IN
THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 52-92 (2003) (summarizing findings of various state task forces that all have
found minority under-representation in jury pools).
51. The Bowers study found that it was the seating of one African American male juror that
was the key in precipitating the drop in the death sentence rate, as the presence of additional African
American males on the jury only marginally brought the death sentence rate down further. Bowers
et al., supra note 44, at 193-95. Juries with two or more African American males returned death
sentences in 37.5% of the cases compared to the 42.9% with a single African American juror. Id.
52. An extensive study conducted by the Dallas Morning News in 2005, for example, found
that more African American jurors were serving on Dallas juries: "The all-white jury... is a fading
sight .... The News' study showed that blacks served on Dallas juries in proportion to their
population-because prosecutors did not eliminate all blacks and defense attorneys excluded white
jurors at three times the rate they rejected blacks." Steve McGonigle et al., A Process of Juror
Elimination: Dallas Prosecutors Say They Don't Discriminate, but Analysis Shows They Are More
Likely to Reject Black Jurors, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 21, 2005, at Al. The increased
representation of blacks on juries was despite the fact that racially based strikes are still common in
jury selection. Id. (finding, inter alia, that "[p]rosecutors excluded eligible blacks from juries at
more than twice the rate they rejected eligible whites"). While it is deplorable that racial
discrimination is still occurring through peremptory strikes, the very fact that more African
American jurors are now serving on juries means-according to the Bowers study-that more
jurors favoring life are likely to be serving in capital cases. IfBatson is having a deterrent effect on
the exercise of some race-based peremptory challenges, that effect is likely to have been enhanced
by the Supreme Court's impatient tone in Miller-El v. Dretke, in which it reversed the state court's
finding of race-neutral reasons for peremptory strikes as wrong by "clear and convincing" evidence.
125 S. Ct. 2317, 2340 (2005).
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while venire pools may still not adequately reflect the minority population,
greater attention to the issue makes it probable that an increasing number of
capital juries include minority jurors compared to the past.
Nor is the inclusion of more minority jurors on capital juries the only
way in which jury composition has made it more likely that cases that
previously would have gone death are now going life. Some observers
believe that the pool of death-qualified jurors from which the petit jury is
chosen now includes an increasing number of potential jurors who, although
they could impose the death penalty, are more troubled by capital punish-
ment and thus more open to the defense's argument for life without parole.53
If this observation is correct and the pool has changed to include more jurors
who are inclined to apply the death penalty narrowly, this obviously would
increase the likelihood that the petit jury will include jurors who will help the
defense obtain the threshold votes for life, especially if defense attorneys are
capable of identifying such jurors at voir dire.
Improved training of capital defense counsel will be addressed shortly,
but a key part of the effort to improve capital representation has been to
develop a better understanding of the profile of jurors who are most likely to
vote life or death.54  This enhanced understanding, when coupled with the
improved use of tools like juror questionnaires, increases the odds not only
that defense counsel will identify potential jurors favorable to their case, but
also potential jurors who are most likely to vote for death no matter how
strong the defendant's case for life.5 5 The exclusion of such strongly pro-
death-penalty jurors-through either peremptory challenges or challenges for
cause 56-is especially critical to the defense, because jurors who tend to
believe that the death penalty is the only proper sentence for an intentional
killing also tend to be particularly strong and vocal advocates for death
53. See Phillip Reese, Fewer Are Sent to Death, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 18, 2006, at Al
(."Jury attitudes have helped drive [the] number [of death sentences] down .... When we (pick
juries), it's very clear that the number of people who have problems with the death penalty has
increased pretty significantly than what we saw in the 1980s and early 1990s."') (quoting George
Williamson, co-chair of the Capital Case Litigation Committee of the California District Attorneys
Association).
54. "For an excellent summary and review of voir dire techniques for capital defense counsel,
see generally Blume et al., supra note 34.
55. See generally SCOTT E. SUNDBY, A LIFE AND DEATH DECISION: A JURY WEIGHS THE
DEATH PENALTY 125-30 (2005) (describing the attitudes of jurors who believe that a death
sentence is the only proper sentence for an intentional killing).
56. Jurors who can be identified as individuals "who will automatically vote for death in every
case" are not allowed to serve because they cannot be impartial and consider mitigating evidence.
Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992). The Capital Jury Project's findings indicate,
however, that at least some capital jurors who ascribe to this view are serving and that voir dire is
ineffective at fully screening out such jurors. See Blume et al., supra note 34, at 1220-24, 1237-39
(citing data from South Carolina and Kentucky showing that some jurors who have actually served
on capital cases hold the view that the death penalty is the only acceptable punishment upon a
murder conviction).
1942 [Vol. 84:1929
The Death Penalty's Future
within the jury room. 57 The removal of such a strongly pro-death juror can
profoundly affect the jury's dynamic even if the replacement juror is some-
one who is inclined to impose a death sentence for murder but is at least open
to the idea that mitigating circumstances may justify a life sentence. And, of
course, if a strongly pro-death-penalty juror is replaced by a juror whose
worldview makes him or her inclined toward a life sentence, the defense will
have significantly increased the chances that the jury will have the threshold
of jurors on the first ballot necessary to obtain a life sentence.58
3. The Role of Life Without Parole.-Another commonly cited factor
for the drop in death sentences is the increased availability of life without
parole and the fact that jurors in states that utilize life without parole must
now expressly be told that "life" means "life without parole."5 9  North
Carolina, for example, has seen a drastic drop in death sentences since it
adopted life without parole in 2001, a decline that some have attributed to the
availability of life without parole as an option.60 This factor is certain to gain
even more attention as Texas-which since 1998 has imposed more death
sentences each year than any other state61'-institutes a life without parole
option.62
The increased availability of life without parole as a sentencing option
undoubtedly has contributed to a decline in death sentences both at the
pretrial and trial stages. At the pretrial stage, prosecutors will be more
willing to accept a guilty plea and forego death if they can assure the public
and the victim's survivors that the defendant will remain in prison for the rest
of his life.63 And at the trial stage, life without parole offers the defense a
means of assuring jurors that the defendant will not pose a future danger 64
57. SUNDBY, supra note 55, at 128-30 (describing how jurors who strongly favor the
imposition of the death penalty influence deliberations).
58. Id. at 72-74 (describing "Hope jurors' attitudes); see also Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen
Garvey, The Merciful Capital Juror, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 165, 187-93 (2004) (identifying the
characteristics ofjurors inclined to show mercy and vote for a life sentence).
59. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 161-62 (1994),(holding that the state court's
failure to inform the jury that the defendant would be ineligible for parole if not sentenced to death
constituted a denial of due process).
60. Editorial, New Parole Directive Overlooks Death Row, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC.
(Greensboro, N.C.), Nov. 7, 2005, at A12. See generally Peter Finn, Given Choice, Virginia Juries
Vote for Life, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1997, at AI (quoting experts who attribute a decline in death
sentences to the increased availability of life without parole); Tharp, supra note 16 (same).
61. See Death Penalty Info. Ctr., supra note 24.
62. Life Without Parole Act, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 787, §§ 1-11, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 2705.
63. For further discussion of the role of the prosecutor in explaining the decline in the number
of death sentences, see infra notes 82-96 and accompanying text.
64. The future dangerousness of the defendant is a primary concern for all capital juries. Even
in California, which only offers a choice of "life without parole" or death, 52% of jurors cited the
concern that the defendant would kill again as a "great" concern and an additional 20% stated it was
a "fairly" important concern. Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How
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and that the defendant will suffer a severe punishment as just deserts for his
crime.
A caveat should be noted, though, when trying to determine just how
much of the decline in death sentences is attributable to the life without
parole option. Even in states that had life without parole from the beginning,
such as California and Pennsylvania, the death rates have shown a steady
decline over roughly the same time period. The number of death sentences
in California, for instance, began a distinct decline after reaching a high of
forty-three in 1999, falling to only eleven in 2004.65 Pennsylvania has seen a
similar drop from fifteen death sentences in 1999 to five in 2004.66
That the overall national drop in death sentences cannot be fully
explained by the fact that more states have moved to life without parole is
not to discount the effect of the increased availability of the life without
parole option. Indeed, one possibility is that the effect of life without parole
on death sentences has in fact been similar for both the "new" and "old" life
without parole states. One difficulty defendants faced in "old" life without
parole states was a great skepticism among jurors that "life" really meant
"life."6 7 If that skepticism has been tempered in recent years, it may be that
at least part of what is reflected in the declining death sentence rates in the
"old" states is an increased receptivity to the idea that "life" really means
"life. ' 68 If this should turn out to be the case-that jurors in the "old" states
Capital Juries Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1166 & n.119 (1997); see
also Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital
Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4-9 (1993) (finding that other than the facts of the crime, future
dangerousness was the most discussed topic among South Carolina capital jurors).
65. Bonczar & Snell, Capital Punishment, 2004, supra note 1, at 5 tbl.4 (reporting that
California received eleven new prisoners under sentence of death in 2004); Tracy L. Snell, Capital
Punishment 1999, BUREAU JUST. STAT. BULL., Dec. 2000, at 8 tbl.5 [hereinafter Snell, Capital
Punishment 1999], available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp99.pdf (reporting that
California received forty-three new prisoners under sentence of death in 1999).
66. Bonczar & Snell, Capital Punishment, 2004, supra note 1, at 5 tbl.4 (reporting that
Pennsylvania received five new prisoners under sentence of death in 2004); Snell, Capital
Punishment 1999, supra note 65, at 8 tbl.5 (reporting that Pennsylvania received fifteen new
prisoners under, sentence of death in 1999).
67. William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death by Default: An Empirical Demonstration
of False and Forced Choices in Capital Sentencing, 77 TEXAS L. REV. 605, 670-71 (1998)
(detailing how jurors in every studied state consistently underestimated the meaning of a life
sentence).
68. Although the most critical measure is whether attitudes have changed among capital jurors,
public opinion polls in California (one of the "old" states) indicate some increase in acceptance of
the idea that "life without parole" means the defendant will not be released; a majority, however,
still believes that "life without parole" does not provide such a guarantee. MARK DICAMILLO &
MERVIN FIELD, FIELD POLL, WHILE STILL STRONGLY SUPPORTING DEATH PENALTY,
CALIFORNIANS HAVE MIXED VIEWS ON SOME ASPECTS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: MAJORITY
OPPOSES DELAY IN THE MORALES EXECUTION 4-5 (2006), available at
http://field.com/fieldpollonline/subscribers/RLS2183.pdf (finding that 35% of 2006 respondents
believed "life without parole" guaranteed against release, compared to 25% in 1992; 54% of 2006
respondents believed that it does not provide a guarantee, compared to 64% in 1992; 11% in both
the 2006 and 1992 polls were undecided).
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have come to a new acceptance of the meaning of life without parole-then
the de facto effect would be the same as the adoption of a "new" statute in-
stituting life without parole as the "true" alternative to death. On the other
hand, if juror skepticism exists in the "new" states as well as the "old" states,
that would suggest that the effect of the expanded availability of the life
without parole option has not been as great as is often assumed. In short, as
with many of the factors being examined, the increased availability of life
without parole as a sentencing factor appears to offer only a partial explana-
tion for the decline in death sentences.
B. The Professionalization of the Capital Defense Bar
The years following Gregg saw a number of cases in which the defense
lawyer's representation was so abysmal as to be almost beyond belief.69 But
cases with sleeping lawyers, drunk lawyers, "high" lawyers, and lawyers who
failed to do any investigation are merely the most spectacular examples of
the criminal justice system's systematic failure to ensure adequate
representation. A startling number of capital defense lawyers have
eventually been disbarred or disciplined after their representation; in North
Carolina, for example, more than one in six death row inmates had an attor-
ney who was eventually disciplined or disbarred.70  These are staggering
numbers for a category of cases where the demands of lawyering are the le-
gal equivalent of neurosurgery.
This distressing state of representation was aided and abetted by the
judiciary at both the trial and the appellate levels.71 Many trial judges
appeared to not comprehend that capital representation required an expertise
not possessed by all lawyers, even lawyers with considerable criminal de-
fense experience.72 As a result, attorneys were appointed in capital cases
who lacked a basic understanding of the necessity of crafting a "case for
life," let alone the knowledge of how to effectively construct such a case
through exhaustive investigation of the defendant's past.73 These failings at
69. See generally Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: Tlte Death Sentence Not for the
Worst Crime but the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994) (summarizing capital cases with
abysmal lawyering).
70. N.C. COAL. FOR A MORATORIUM, POOR LAWYERING AND THE DEATH PENALTY 1,
http://www.ncmoratorium.org/documents/issue poorlawyer.pdf.
71. See generally William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and
Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 91 (1995) (arguing
that the Supreme Court's decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), has
undermined the right to counsel).
72. See id. at 156-60 (detailing several cases where the defendant's appointed counsel failed to
provide effective assistance).
73. See id. at 157-60 (arguing that a mitigation investigation that "at least extends to collecting
every available document on which the client's name appears" should be required to render
reasonably effective assistance and detailing several cases where defendant's counsel failed to
present readily available mitigation evidence).
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the trial level were exacerbated by an appellate standard for assessing inef-
fective assistance of counsel that largely turned a blind eye to the unique
demands and skills required in all capital cases.74
This indictment of the state of capital representation in the aftermath of
Gregg is not to overlook that there were superb lawyers at the time who were
developing the art of defending death penalty cases and who were litigating
the miscarriages of justice that were occurring. The process took time,
however, and by necessity much of the emerging capital defense bar's initial
energy after Gregg was devoted to trying to undo the damage of trials that
had already taken place.75 Ultimately, though, pushed by organizations like
the American Bar Association and reacting to commission reports finding
that incompetent representation was a key cause of the plague of wrongful
convictions, legislatures and courts began to acknowledge that at least mini-
mal standards needed to be implemented.76 Indeed, the concern over
competent capital representation is now sufficiently high profile that
President Bush pledged in his 2005 State of the Union "to fund special
training for defense counsel in capital cases, because people on trial for their
lives must have competent lawyers by their side.,
77
Even the Supreme Court, which for decades had been exceedingly
deferential to capital defense attorneys' "strategic decisions" to forego even
rudimentary investigations, has recently begun to react. Although the Sixth
Amendment standard for competent representation in capital cases remains
far below what research has shown is required to mount a successful "case
for life," the Court finally appears to be patrolling at least the outermost
parameters of ineffective representation.78
74. See id. at 155-60 (describing various appellate decisions where deficient performance
claims were denied).
75. That these post-conviction challenges were uncovering a high rate of error is evidenced by
the high reversal rates for death sentences from this time period. See James S. Liebman et al.,
Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995, 78 TExAS L. REv. 1839, 1850 (2000)
(finding that 68% of all death sentences that were reviewed between 1973 and 1995 were
overturned because of serious error).
76. See, e.g., Jonathan Alter & Mark Miller, A Life or Death Gamble, NEWSWEEK, May 29,
2000, at 22 (reporting that the death penalty is "on the defensive" after the recent increase in
evidence pointing to wrongful convictions and implying that many wrongful convictions are due to
"the problem of poor legal counsel"); Catherine Cowan, States Revisit the Death Penalty, ST.
Gov'T NEWS, May 1, 2001, at 12 (noting that the "most pervasive reason for wrongful death-row
convictions is incompetent defense" and describing how the increased exoneration of death row
inmates due to DNA evidence has prompted states to consider changes in state procedures and
laws); Wendy N. Davis, Inching Away from Death?, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2005, at 14 (arguing that
recent decisions from the Supreme Court indicate a wariness of the lawyering in capital cases and
noting that the Court relied on ABA guidelines in its most recent ineffective assistance case,
Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S. Ct. 2456 (2005)).
77. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Feb. 2, 2005), in WASH. POST, Feb.
3, 2005, at Al 5.
78. See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S. Ct. 2456, 2468 (2005) (finding a defense attorney's
failure to look at the file regarding the defendant's prior convictions to be ineffective assistance of
counsel); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 535-38 (2003) (holding that defense counsel's
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The result of these decades' worth of developments is a discernable
improvement in the quality of representation. 79 The need for a lawyer to be
specially trained in capital defense is now widely recognized and has fostered
the emergence of a professional capital defense bar. Some states that have
had particularly troubling histories with incompetent capital representation,
such as Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia, have created statewide sys-
tems specifically devoted to capital representation.80 While much remains to
be done for the criminal justice system to fully address the problem of
providing quality capital representation in all cases, 81 even modest
improvements in capital representation will have contributed to the decline in
death sentences in two significant ways.
inadequate investigation into the defendant's background prejudiced the defendant); Terry Williams
v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 388-89 (2000) (finding ineffective assistance where a defense attorney
failed to investigate mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of the trial).
79. In explaining the decline in Georgia's death sentences, Stephen Bright, Director of the
Southern Center for Human Rights, who has been involved in capital litigation since 1982, offered
the observation that
[t]he quality of defense lawyering is much better .... Georgia went away from a
system where local judges appointed local lawyers, and many of those lawyers were
unqualified. Instead ofjust any local yokel who happens to have a bar card, it will now
be somebody who has experience and is trained and knows how to investigate a case
and put on mitigating evidence.
Mike Tolson, Fewer Killers Getting Sentenced to Death: Sharp Drop Seen Across the Nation,
Including in Texas, HOUSTON CHRON., May 22, 2005, at Al.
80. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-12-121 (2004) (creating the Office of the Georgia Capital
Defender to represent indigent persons charged with a capital felony for which the death penalty is
being sought); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-498.2 (2005) (establishing the Office of Indigent Defense
Services in North Carolina); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-163.8(A) (2004) (mandating the Virginia
Indigent Defense Commission to adopt standards for attorneys who represent capital defendants).
81. While the overall quality of capital defense has improved, the system continues to be
confronted with disparities in the quality of representation that raise concerns over arbitrariness.
Even among competent capital lawyers, some will be more skilled than others in the art of
presenting a case for life to the jury. Although disparity in quality of representation is present in all
areas of lawyering, its effect is particularly enhanced at a capital penalty phase where the argument
is not simply over what happened as a historical fact (did the defendant kill the victim?) but over
what morality requires as the penalty (does the defendant deserve to die?). This latter type of
argument requires both Shakespearean talent and Blackstone-like mastery of the law. See Scott E.
Sundby, Moral Accuracy and "Wobble" in Capital Sentencing, 80 IND. L.J. 56, 57-58 (2005).
Moreover, the Court's minimal standard for assessing what constitutes effective assistance of
counsel provides no guarantee that a defendant who was represented by a "competent" lawyer under
the Sixth Amendment would not have received a death sentence if represented by a more
conscientious lawyer. Studies of capital juries show that the difference between a life and a death
sentence will often depend on the defense providing a compelling story for life. SUNDBY, supra
note 55, at 137. Because a routine investigation of a defendant's background will satisfy the
Court's definition of "effective assistance of counsel," a lawyer who fails to conduct the arduous
process actually required to effectively construct a case for life can still meet the constitutional
standard for effective assistance. Id. The lawyer, therefore, will have been just competent enough
to get his client executed: doing sufficient investigation to make it over the Sixth Amendment bar
but not enough to have ever given his client a realistic chance for a life verdict. Id. at 136-37.
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The first is obvious: better lawyers can concretely change the outcome
of cases through more sophisticated jury selection, more exhaustive
investigation, and better presentation of cases for life. And keep in mind that
for improved representation to have an impact, it is not necessary for the
quality of representation to have taken such quantum leaps forward that de-
fense attorneys suddenly are presenting cases that lead twelve jurors at a time
to immediately embrace a life verdict. Because a life sentence in any one
case may depend only on whether one or two additional jurors can be per-
suaded to vote "life" or "undecided" on the initial ballot, even small
improvements in capital lawyers' skills at jury selection, investigation, and
presentation can move cases from the "death" to the "life" category when
measured over time in a large run of cases.
C. More Cautious Prosecutors
The second major impact of improved capital representation takes us
outside the jury room and into the realm of the prosecutor. And if we are
searching for actors besides the jury who can cause a significant case-by-case
drop in the death penalty rate by their actions alone, prosecutors must be the
primary focus. Indeed, given that the prosecutor controls the initial decision
over whether to seek the death penalty and, later, whether to accept or reject
a plea that avoids a death sentence, the prosecutor's actions are probably the
most influential of any actor in affecting death sentencing rates.
As noted earlier, the prosecutor's decision whether to seek the death
82penalty in a case will be driven by a multitude of factors. But while a
prosecutor's decision to some extent inevitably will be idiosyncratic, certain
factors are likely to enter into almost all of the decisions, including how vig-
orous the prosecutor expects the defense to be.
A prosecutor will recognize, for instance, that well-trained capital
defenders will request the appointment of a number of experts and resources
to construct the type of case for life at the penalty phase required by the Sixth
Amendment's duty of effective representation. It is difficult to conceive of a
case, for example, where a mental health expert would not be utilized at least
for evaluation. 83 Most cases will also require additional experts, such as indi-
viduals with an expertise specific to the defendant's circumstances (for
example, an expert on child abuse or drug abuse), mitigation investigators to
undertake the painstaking reconstruction of the defendant's life, a jury
selection expert, and forensic experts with specialties in areas such as
82. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
83. Some states provide mental health experts as a matter of statutory right in capital cases. See
OHIO REV. CODE § 2929.03(D)(1) (1997) ("When death may be imposed as a penalty, the
court... upon the request of the defendant, shall require a mental examination to be made."); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1 (2004) (giving indigent capital defendants the right to the assistance of a
court-appointed psychiatrist or clinical psychologist).
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pathology, DNA testing, fingerprinting, and ballistics.84 And while trial
judges still may not provide every resource requested by the defense, courts
appear to be increasingly receptive to an emerging model of capital repre-
sentation that, for both fairness and constitutional reasons, includes a defense
team of investigators and experts-a model to which the Supreme Court's
recent ineffective assistance of counsel decisions give added impetus.
85
Not surprisingly, this basic model is expensive.8 6 Nor are we talking
about the costs of assembling a "dream team" or hiring the leading experts in
a field. For capital defense, experts and investigators are "necessities, not
,,87 inaarluxuries, and in an area where the law is continually evolving, extensive
pretrial preparation to properly develop legal challenges is a fundamental
part of the job-especially in a world where procedural default has come to
have draconian consequences for post-conviction relief. The
professionalization of capital defense has therefore made the cost of a capital
case a necessary part of a prosecutor's decision of whether to file a case as
capital;88 indeed, depending on the funding scheme used by the state, a major
84. In the "sniper trial" of Lee Boyd Malvo, for instance, the defense needed funds not only to
have extensive mental health examinations but also for travel to interview witnesses from Malvo's
childhood, most of whom were in the Caribbean, making the case "one of the most expensive
defenses in recent memory." Jeff Green, Most Expensive Defense: Malvo 's Defense Team Granted
Advance to Transport More Than 60 Witnesses from Washington, Louisiana and Jamaica,
SPRINGFIELD CONNECTION (Springfield, Va.), Sept. 4, 2003,
http://www.connectionnewspapers.com/printarticle.asp?article=23230&archive--true. The jury
ultimately heard from 140 witnesses over the three-week trial and returned a life sentence. Jim
McElhatton, Malvo Sentenced to Life in Prison; Victims' Kin Sorry Sniper Avoids Death, WASH.
TIMES, Dec. 24, 2003, at Al.
85. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
86. States with the death penalty have consistently found that the death penalty is more costly to
administer than life imprisonment. Costs of the Death Penalty and Related Issues: Hearing Before
the Assembled Standing Comms. on Codes, Judiciary, and Correction, 228th Sess. 6-10 (N.Y.
2005) (statement of Richard C. Dieter, Executive Director, Death Penalty Information Center). A
state-sponsored study of Kansas's death penalty, for example, concluded that capital cases are 70%
more expensive than noncapital cases; the trial costs alone were almost sixteen times greater for
capital cases and the appellate process twenty-one times greater. Id. at 8 (citing BARBARA J.
HINTON, LEGISLATIVE Div. OF POST AUDIT, STATE OF KAN., PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT:
COSTS INCURRED FOR DEATH PENALTY CASES: A K-GOAL AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS 11-13 (2003), http://www.kslegislature.org/postaudit/audits-perform/04paO3a.pdf).
A study of capital cases in the state of Washington found that "death penalty cases at the trial level
are far more expensive and lengthy than ordinary aggravated murder cases." RICHARD P. GUY,
STATUS REPORT ON THE DEATH PENALTY IN WASHINGTON STATE 7 (2000),
http://www.courts.wa.gov/newsinfo/content/deathpenalty/deathpenalty.pdf. In King County, for
example, aggravated murder cases that were pursued at trial as death penalty cases averaged
$433,262 compared to $195,538 for aggravated murder cases without a death penalty component.
Id. at 10.
87. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
88. See, e.g., Matthai Chakko Kuruvila, DA Says He Won't Seek Death Penalty, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 24, 2004, at B1 (reporting the decision by the district attorney's office to
accept a plea bargain for a life sentence and not seek a death sentence on retrial in part because the
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capital prosecution can push a county to the brink of bankruptcy. 89 And this
is merely the cost at the trial stage; if a death sentence is returned, the jury's
verdict is simply the first step in a long appeals process that will escalate the
cost over time.
The impact of a professionalized capital defense bar on the
prosecution's decision-making, however, goes far beyond increasing the
state's monetary expenditures. To the extent that risk averseness is a factor
affecting prosecutors, 90 a professionalized capital defense bar will heighten
the importance of that factor in prosecutorial decision-making. A prosecutor
who seeks death not only provides the defense with access to extensive re-
sources at the penalty phase, but also ensures that the guilt phase will receive
enhanced scrutiny and additional resources.91 Thus, a prosecutor's decision
to seek the death penalty will in most cases make his or her task at the guilt
phase more difficult if the case goes to trial.
A prosecutor faced with a professionally prepared capital defense,
therefore, may find a plea to a sentence of life without parole attractive for a
variety of reasons: it avoids the unique costs of a capital trial and appeal; it
ensures an outcome that will satisfy the community's concerns over the
defendant's dangerousness while avoiding the risk that a jury will acquit or
convict on a lesser offense; it avoids a perceived "defeat" for the prosecutor
if the jury fails to return a sentence of death; and it allows a prosecutor to
communicate the desirability of such a plea to the victim's survivors in a
persuasive way by pointing out that the defendant's attorneys are mounting a
first trial had cost almost $500,000 and pursuing another capital trial would cost taxpayers millions
more).
89. Funding for capital prosecutions varies from state to state. In states such as Washington
where the funding is by the county, a capital case can cause a county significant financial hardship.
By agreeing to accept life pleas in the "Green River Killer" case, for instance, King County was
estimated to have saved $6 million by not going to trial. Keith Ervin, Ridgway's Plea Frees Up $6
Million for County, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 15, 2003, at B2 (reporting that allowing the Green River
serial killer to plead to life in return for agreeing to cooperate with investigators "produced a minor
financial windfall for the financially struggling ... [c]ounty" by allowing it to avoid the cost of
funding a capital trial). The potential for such prosecutions to "devastate" a county's budget led the
state to pass legislation in 1999 allowing state reimbursement of smaller counties for some of the
expenses of a capital prosecution. GUY, supra note 86, at 7-8.
90. Defense counsel in the Eric Rudolph bombing case, for example, showed great skill in
understanding how to negotiate a life plea given the prosecution's concerns about "risking an
acquittal or spending the millions of dollars it would take to bring the cases to trial." Jonathan
Ringel, Rudolph Defenders Read Feds'Signals to Make a Plea Deal, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP.
(Atlanta, Ga.), Apr. 19, 2005, at 1. See generally Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the
Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REv. 2463, 2473 (2004) (noting that prosecutors can "bargain
away" their weak cases by making irresistible plea offers to defendants); James Vorenberg, Decent
Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1521, 1535 (1981) (suggesting that prosecutors
may offer the greatest incentives to plead to defendants with the best chance of acquittal).
91. This is not to suggest that noncapital cases should not receive the same level of attention
and resources, but simply to describe the reality of the current situation. See Adam Liptak, Serving
Life, with No Chance of Redemption, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2005, at AI (reporting that death cases
receive far greater resources and review than life cases).
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skilled defense that may carry a risk of acquittal-the most dreaded outcome
from the survivors' viewpoint-and that a plea to life will also keep the
process from dragging out for what, from the survivors' viewpoint, will seem
an interminable time.
Consideration of how to use these incentives to obtain a noncapital
disposition is now a standard part of capital defense strategy. Indeed, part of
the capital defense bar's process of professionalization has been an increas-
ing focus on how to get the possibility of a death sentence out of a case
early.92 Courses and training sessions for capital defense attorneys now fre-
quently address how to structure a case so that the issue of death never
reaches the jury.93
In addition to a greater receptivity to plea bargaining to a noncapital
disposition, increased prosecutorial caution has manifested itself in other
ways. In response to studies documenting the death penalty's problems with
discrimination and fairness, at least some prosecutorial offices now have
screening procedures in place that are designed to foster a more selective ap-
proach in deciding which cases are pursued as capital.94 It may also be that
as the rate of violent crime has dropped over the past decade and public con-
cern over crime has moved down the list of "hot button" issues, local
prosecutors are feeling less community pressure to pursue death sentences in
as wide a range of murder cases. This may be especially true in large urban
areas where the voting public's perception of a prosecutorial office is not as
likely to be driven by specific murder cases, unlike in less populous areas
where murder cases are rare and the public may judge a prosecutor on
whether he or she seeks the death sentence on a case-by-case basis.95
92. See generally Russell Stetler, Commentary on Counsel's Duty to Seek and Negotiate a
Disposition in Capital Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1157, 1157 (2003) (highlighting the need for
defense attorneys to negotiate pleas and arguing that the number of death sentences since Furman
would have been "greatly diminished" if defense counsel had been aggressively seeking pleas).
93. This aspect of litigation strategy takes on increasing importance as access to habeas corpus
is tightened. The number of death sentences may be declining, but trying to overturn a death
sentence is becoming more difficult. See Leigh B. Bienen, The Quality of Justice in Capital Cases:
Illinois as a Case Study, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1998, at 193, 193 (reporting that
restrictions on federal habeas corpus have made it very difficult to constitutionally challenge state
death sentences and indicating that the political climate surrounding judicial elections has made it
more difficult for state judges to overturn death sentences).
94. See Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the
Department of Justice's Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 406-19 (1999) (describing the review
process within the Department of Justice for deciding whether a federal death penalty prosecution
may proceed).
95. Cf JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT & REVIEW COMM'N, VA. ASSEMBLY, COMM'N DRAFT:
REVIEW OF VIRGINIA'S SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 50 (2001),
http://jlarc.state.va.us/Meetings/December0l/capital.pdf (finding that prosecutors in high-density
urban areas sought the death penalty 15% less often than those in areas with lower population
density). But see SCATTERED JUSTICE: GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITIES OF THE DEATH PENALTY,
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, (2004),
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As with the other factors, it is difficult to gauge just how many cases are
now tried as life cases or are pled out to life that in prior years would have
resulted in a death sentence.96 Indeed, prosecutorial discretion illustrates
well how the interdependence between the various micro-factors makes
gauging the effect of any one factor particularly difficult. Greater jury re-
luctance to return death sentences, for instance, undoubtedly has made
prosecutors less inclined to pursue the death penalty in certain cases. Ironi-
cally though, this effect on prosecutors eventually could result in statistics
showing that juries are returning death sentences in a higher percentage of
cases than before and create the misleading impression that juries have sud-
denly become more willing to impose death sentences. In fact, however,
such a higher percentage return of death sentences would merely reflect that
prosecutors were now seeking death in only the most aggravated cases, a
process that itself would have begun because juries had become increasingly
reluctant to impose death sentences. In short, as with the other factors, we
can state with some confidence that prosecutorial discretion has played a role
in the decline in death sentences, but its role is a complex one that both influ-
ences and is influenced by the other factors at work.
D. The Impact of Categorical Exclusions of Death-Eligible Defendants
Finally, of course, the drop in death sentences can be partly attributed to
the exclusion of certain categories of defendants. While the Supreme Court's
2005 holding in Roper v. Simmons 97 ruled that the juvenile death penalty was
unconstitutional, it only formalized what already had happened in the
courtroom. 98 By the time Simmons was decided, imposition of the juvenile
death penalty had declined to the point that it was only being imposed in the
rarest of instances (which, of course, was part of the Court's rationale in
Simmons).99 Indeed, the post-Gregg experience with the juvenile death
penalty largely mirrors the overall trend with death sentences: use of the
http://www.aclu.org/capital/unequal/l0532pub20040305.html (reviewing studies showing that in
some states urban prosecutors seek the death penalty at a higher rate).
96. Some prosecutors maintain that the decline in death sentences is not because prosecutors are
exercising greater selectivity, but because fewer cases are now arising that call for prosecution as
death penalty cases. See Reese, supra note 53 (quoting prosecutors who maintain that the number
of "outrageous" murders justifying a death sentence has declined and that tougher stances on
recidivism, such as California's Three Strikes law, have removed many of the worst criminals
before they could commit a capital crime). Other commentators, however, maintain that "there are
always more potential capital punishment cases than there are capital punishment prosecutions." Id.
(summarizing the views of Professor Franklin Zimring). It may be true that in some localities there
are simply fewer capital cases, but given that felony-murder is an aggravating factor in most
jurisdictions and that most states have a broadly applicable aggravator such as "heinous and cruel"
or "wantonly vile," it is difficult to imagine that on a national scale a greater exercise of
prosecutorial selectivity is not playing a role in winnowing down the number of cases where the
death penalty is actually sought at trial.
97. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 564-65.
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juvenile death penalty peaked in 1994-when seventeen death sentences
were imposed on juvenile offendersI 0 0-and then began a fairly steady
decline. By the years 2003 and 2004 only two juvenile death sentences were
imposed annually, constituting less than 2% of the total death sentences im-
posed for each of those years.
10 1
Abolition of the juvenile death sentence was undeniably an important
victory for opponents of the death penalty, particularly because it was first
won at the non-constitutional level (thus demonstrating that limits on the
death penalty, and perhaps eventually abolition, can be won without grand
constitutional pronouncements). For our more immediate purpose of tracing
causes for the decline in overall death sentences, however, the demise of the
juvenile death penalty can provide only a sliver of an explanation. Even at
its peak the juvenile death penalty constituted only roughly 5% of the annual
number of death sentences being imposed.10 2 Thus, even though the juvenile
death penalty itself declined almost 90% over the ten-year period between
1994 and 2004, the aggregate impact on the total number of death sentences
was not that significant in terms of absolute numbers.
The other major exclusion of death-eligible defendants in the past
decade was to place mentally retarded defendants beyond the reach of capital
punishment. As with the juvenile death penalty, the proper marking point is
not the Supreme Court decision finding that execution of mentally retarded
individuals violated the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishment. By the time the Court made that ruling in 2002 in Atkins v.
Virginia,10 3 the Court was merely recognizing a phenomenon already occur-
ring in the state and federal legislatures. As the Atkins majority recounted,
the movement started in Georgia with a legislatively enacted ban on execut-
ing mentally retarded defendants in 1986 after the execution of a mentally
retarded defendant engendered a public outcry. 10 4 Congress soon followed
with a similar ban when re-enacting the federal death penalty in 1989 and
was joined by Maryland that same year. 105 Despite the Court's refusal to
recognize a constitutional ban in 1989,106 the trickle of legislation quickly
gained momentum. By 2001 sixteen jurisdictions had enacted such bans and
100. VICTOR STREIB, REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY 9 (2005),
http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/documents/juvdeath.pdf.
101. Id.
102. Id. In 1994, the seventeen juvenile death sentences represented 5.4% of the 315 death
sentences imposed. Id.
103. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
104. Id. at313-14.
105. Id. at314.
106. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989) ("[A]t present, there is insufficient evidence
of a national consensus against executing mentally retarded people convicted of capital offenses for
us to conclude that it is categorically prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.").
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more were under active consideration. 0 7 The Atkins Court noted that at the
time of its decision in 2002, only five states were actively executing defen-
dants with IQs under 70, making the practice "truly unusual."' 0 8
It is difficult to quantify just how much of the drop in death sentences
over the past decade is attributable to the fact that mentally retarded
defendants are no longer subject to the death penalty. One study found that
thirty-five mentally retarded defendants had been executed between 1976 and
1997,1°9 but because the execution rate is far below the sentencing rate, that
does not reveal how many mentally retarded defendants were in fact being
sentenced to death on an annual basis between Gregg and Atkins." 0 Post-
Atkins challenges may provide a better sense as inmates attempt to overturn
death sentences based on an argument that they are mentally retarded and,
therefore, that their death sentences are now unconstitutional."' Whatever
the final figure for releases based on Atkins, however, it will unavoidably
undercount the effect that the movement to ban the death penalty for men-
tally retarded defendants has had on the annual death sentencing rate. This
undercounting will occur for two reasons: first, because the total will not in-
clude defendants in states that banned the execution of mentally retarded
individuals prior to Atkins; and second, because some prosecutors even in
states that still formally allowed such executions prior to Atkins almost
107. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-15.
108. Id. at 316 & n.20.
109. Denis Keyes et al., People with Mental Retardation Are Dying, Legally, 35 MENTAL
RETARDATION 59, 59-60 (1997). An electronic copy of a chart summarizing the study, along with
video interviews with two of the mentally retarded death row prisoners mentioned in the study, can
be found at AdvocacyOne's website, http://advocacyone.org/deathpenalty.html.
110. North Carolina's experience offers some insight. Following the adoption of a 2001 law
banning the execution of mentally retarded defendants, claims of mental retardation by death row
inmates resulted in the commutation of six sentences by the end of 2003 from a total death row
population of 195. Scott Michels, Liberty Man May Avoid Execution, NEWS & REC. (Greensboro,
N.C.), Dec. 10, 2003, at BI (noting release of mentally retarded death row inmates). See generally
Bonczar & Snell, Capital Punishment, 2003, supra note 19, at 1 (reporting that at the end of 2003,
North Carolina had a death row population of 195).
111. For example, Louisiana granted clemency to Herbert Welcome after Atkins because of his
mental retardation. Gwen Filosa, Mentally Disabled Inmate Spared, TIMES-PiCAYUNE (New
Orleans, La.), May 10, 2003, at 4. Welcome's retardation had been recognized prior to Atkins, but
three prior governors had refused to grant clemency despite a recommendation from the clemency
board and the support of the prosecutor and the victim's family. Amnesty Int'l, Open Letter to the
President on the Death Penalty (Jan. I, 1994),
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGAMR510011994.
The fate of the petitioner in Atkins, Daryl Atkins, remains unclear. On remand a jury was
empanelled to determine the sole issue of whether Atkins was retarded. Atkins v. Commonwealth,
2006 WL 1550010, at *2 (Va. June 8, 2006). After a trial, the jury found that he was not mentally
retarded and the trial judge reinstated his death sentence. Id. The Supreme Court of Virginia,
however, reversed the jury's finding because of procedural errors. Id. at *5-*8. The Court found
that a prosecution witness had improperly been allowed to testify as an expert and that the judge had
erred in informing the jury, which was to decide only if Atkins was mentally retarded, that a
previous jury had sentenced him to death. Id. The case was remanded for another trial on whether
Atkins was mentally retarded. Id. at *9.
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certainly chose not to pursue death sentences because of a sense that public
sentiment was turning against the death penalty for mentally retarded
defendants.
As with the juvenile death penalty, then, the exclusion of mentally
retarded defendants does account for some of the decline in the number of
death sentences in the past decade. Trying to quantify this impact is difficult,
however, and can account for only a portion of the decline in annual sen-
tences over the past decade. For instance, Georgia-which banned death
sentences for the mentally retarded as early as 1986-saw the most signifi-
cant decline long after the ban had come into effect." 2 More importantly,
though, for our purpose of trying to chart the death penalty's future is the
need to account for the fact that the nationwide bans instituted by Simmons
and Atkins were, in a sense, one-shot deals; that is, even if the removal of
juvenile and mentally retarded defendants from the death-eligible pool ac-
counts for a significant percentage of the decline in death sentences between
1996 and 2005, that removal has now run its course because death sentences
are no longer being imposed on juveniles and mentally retarded individuals.
Any further erosion in the number of annual death sentences will have to
come from the continued effect of other factors, such as improving capital
representation, or from new factors that have yet to come into play.
E. Summary: The Micro View of the Decline in Death Sentences
For those who favor the abolition of the death penalty, much good news
lies in the declining number of death sentences over the past decade. A dis-
tinctive and steady decline has been achieved, and the downward trend is
observable in all of the death penalty states; not a single state showed an up-
ward trend in the number of death sentences. Moreover, significant declines
occurred in all of the states that historically have added the most new inmates
to their death rows--California, Texas, Florida, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, Oklahoma, and Alabama."13
What is particularly striking about this decline is that it has been
achieved essentially on a case-by-case basis. No major death penalty states
abolished capital punishment. Nor did any blockbuster judicial opinions
suddenly remove broad categories of cases from the death-eligible pool (as
McCleskey v. Kemp 114 might have if the Court had ruled that statistical evi-
dence could be used to show racial bias). Toward the end of the period in
112. See Bonczar & Snell, Capital Punishment, 2003, supra note 19, at 15 (showing a sharp
decline in death sentences handed down after the year 2000).
113. Id. Note that these are not necessarily the states with the highest annual execution rates.
See id. at 1 (stating that the greatest numbers of executions since 1977 have been performed by
Texas, Virginia, Oklahoma, Missouri, and Florida).
114. 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (holding that statistical evidence of systemic discrimination failed to
prove that the individual defendant was a victim of discrimination).
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question the Supreme Court did exclude two categories of defendants from
the death penalty-juvenile offenders and the mentally retarded-but these
exclusions can explain only a small part of the overall decline in real
numbers, and the cases primarily constitutionalized what was already
happening in the legislatures and courtrooms.
This case-by-case reduction in the death penalty raises several important
considerations for those trying to understand the future of the death penalty
as both a legal and a social phenomenon. The tendency when looking at a
steady downward trend is to assume that large-scale factors are at work that
will continue the trend until the natural endpoint-in this case no more death
sentences-is reached. From this perspective, one might think of the death
penalty as a candle burning itself out as the flames of criticism slowly con-
sume it until nothing is left. If this viewpoint is correct, the abolition process
is now an inevitable one that must simply run its course, and certainly many
of the media reports on the decline in death sentences imply that this is what
is occurring.
A further question, however, must be asked before confidently arriving
at such a conclusion: is it possible that the factors that were traced above
have gradually trimmed away those cases where the death penalty was most
vulnerable and left us with a core of cases that may stubbornly resist further
trimming? In other words, if, as argued above, a number of micro-factors are
at work that explain on a case-by-case basis why a life sentence was obtained
that ten years earlier would have come back death, then we need to look at
the remaining pool of cases where death sentences are still being returned
and ask whether these micro-factors can continue to knock off death sen-
tences one-by-one until the death penalty is no more. From this perspective,
abolition becomes a far more daunting challenge. It may still be possible that
between the selection of more representative juries, the continued profes-
sionalization of the capital defense bar, and the growth of the various
pressures that have made prosecutors more reluctant to seek death, the num-
ber of death sentences will dwindle toward zero. The abolitionist's
challenge, though, is more akin to having to blow out a number of candles
one-by-one while simultaneously keeping new ones from being lit, rather
than the earlier comparison of watching a candle bum itself out. The next
step, therefore, is to determine whether a category of death penalty cases ex-
ists that is likely to be resistant to further reduction.
II. The McVeigh Factor and the Death Penalty's Resilience
In his 1972 concurrence in Furman v. Georgia, Justice Marshall
suggested that if the American public were fully informed about the realities
of the death penalty they would oppose capital punishment. H"5 Interestingly,
if one looks at the key issues that make for an "informed" public on capital
115. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 361-63 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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punishment, the results suggest a public that is increasingly aware of prob-
lems with the administration of the death penalty: 59% believe that an
innocent person has been executed within the past five years," 6 65% believe
that a poor person is more likely to receive a death sentence for committing
the same crime than someone who is not poor,' 17 and 50% believe that a
black person is more likely to receive a death sentence for committing the
same crime than a white person.18
Perhaps most astonishing is the change over the years in the public's
perception of whether the death penalty is a deterrent to murder. In a 2004
Gallup Poll, only 35% of respondents believed that the death penalty was a
deterrent and 62% did not, an almost complete reversal from a 1985 Gallup
Poll in which 62% believed that the death penalty was a deterrent and only
31% did not.' 19 Given that deterrence has been one of the primary pillars of
America's support for the death penalty (and was one of the major topics that
Justice Marshall argued was misunderstood by the public), 20 this dramatic
shift would seem to be a major victory in undermining support for the death
penalty.
Yet, despite these major shifts in the public's attitude on the fairness
and efficacy of the death penalty, general support for the death penalty
remains high. As recently as 2005, one Gallup poll found that 74% of
respondents stated that they "favor[ed] the death penalty for a person con-
victed of murder."'121  And despite some fluctuation both up and down,
support for the death penalty has consistently averaged around two-thirds of
respondents since the year 2000.122
A danger exists in making too much of opinion polls, and, as will be
argued later, support for the death penalty is probably softer than the basic
poll results indicate. 23 Still, if we are asking if a core group of cases exists
that may resist the micro-factors' pressure toward abolition, one cannot ig-
nore the public's continued voicing of support for the death penalty despite
an increasing awareness of capital punishment's problems. The question
then becomes: what rationale explains the public's refusal to abandon
116. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
117. THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1999, at 155, 156 (George Gallup, Jr. ed., 2000).
118. Id.
119. David W. Moore, Public Divided Between Death Penalty and Life Imprisonment Without
Parole, in THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 2004, at 226, 227 (Alec M. Gallup & Frank
Newport eds., 2006).
120. "The most hotly contested issue regarding capital punishment is whether it is better than
life imprisonment as a deterrent." Furman, 408 U.S. at 345 (Marshall, J., concurring); see also id.
at 348-54 (detailing the argument that evidence does not support a deterrence effect for the death
penalty).
121. Jones, Americans' Views, supra note 36, at 104.
122. Saad, supra note 4, at 9.
123. See infra notes 154-59 and accompanying text.
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support of the death penalty despite its difficulties and even though they do
not generally believe that the death penalty deters?
The label attached to that rationale is likely to be a loaded one, which
may be why discussion of the death penalty is often fraught with
misunderstanding. Before attaching a label, therefore, it may be helpful to
approach the rationale indirectly.
First, one can ask if there is an archetypal case that would be most likely
to result in a death sentence despite the convergence of all of the micro-
factors that we have previously examined-that is, what type of case is likely
to end in a death sentence despite superb defense lawyers and a
representative death-qualified jury that fully believes that "life without
parole" means the defendant will never be released? In identifying such a
case, one should look for the characteristics that are most frequently seen in
cases where jurors return death sentences-a defendant who takes the lives
of innocent victims as they go about their everyday affairs, refuses to express
any remorse for his cold-blooded actions, and has no circumstances showing
that he lacked free will. The Timothy McVeigh case is one of the clearest
examples of such a case, and, in the end, 80% of the public supported his
execution, including 20% who otherwise opposed the death penalty.124 There
appears, therefore, to be certain defendants, like Timothy McVeigh, who
commit a crime for which a large segment of the American populace will
believe that death is the only proper sentence.
It is also helpful, when trying to identify the reason the death penalty
commands continuing strong support, to look at the reasons that respondents
in recent public opinion polls give for supporting the death penalty. Only
29% choose as their top priority a utilitarian reason related to either
deterrence (11% pick general deterrence and 7% choose keeping the
defendant from committing another crime) or cost (11% identify "sav[ing]
taxpayers money"). 125 The other top choices, accounting for the responses of
124. THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 2001, at 110 (George Gallup, Jr. ed., 2002); see also
Rory K. Little, What Federal Prosecutors Really Think. The Puzzle of Statistical Race Disparity
Versus Specific Guilt, and the Specter of Timothy McVeigh, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1591, 1604 & n.63
(2004) (describing McVeigh as "'the poster child for the federal death penalty"').
125. Jeffrey M. Jones, Understanding Americans' Support for the Death Penalty, THE GALLUP
POLL TUESDAY BRIEFING, June 2003, at 101, 101. The respondents identifying utilitarian reasons
for supporting the death penalty may represent individuals who still are subject to Justice Marshall's
premise that accurate information about the death penalty would erode public support. Those
believing that the death penalty saves taxpayers' money, for example, are clearly wrong and
arguably might no longer support the death penalty if given the actual cost figures. See supra note
86 (explaining that states have found the death penalty to be more costly to administer than life
imprisonment).
Likewise, those respondents citing specific or general deterrence as their reasons for support can
arguably be dissuaded if shown the empirical evidence. Although studies occasionally appear
which contend that a deterrent effect can be empirically detected, see, e.g., Hashem Dezhbakhsh et
al., Does Capital Punishment Have a Deterrent Effect? New Evidence From Postmoratorium Panel
Data, 5 AM. L. & EcON. REV. 344, 369 (2003) (finding that on average an execution deters eighteen
murders), the overwhelming weight of scholarly opinion is that empirical evidence of general
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almost two-thirds of the respondents, revolved around a theme quite distinct
from deterrence and cost: "an eye for an eye/they took a life/fits the crime"
(37%), "they deserve it" (13%), "Biblical reasons" (5%), "serve justice"
(4%), "fair punishment" (3%), and "would help/benefit families of victims"
(2%). 126
As noted earlier, trying to attach a label to the theme reflected in these
responses is difficult without appearing, even inadvertently, to show a bias.
The Gallup summary of the above poll on why Americans favor the death
penalty, for instance, described the results as showing that "more than half of
those who favor the death penalty cite something about revenge."' 27  One
strongly suspects, however, that if "revenge" had specifically been given as a
choice in the poll, few of the respondents would have chosen it, and that the
respondents in the actual poll who chose "fair punishment," 'justice," and
even an "eye for an eye" would take umbrage at the recharacterization of
their rationale as one of "revenge."
Certainly this has been the reaction of actual jurors who have imposed
death sentences ("death jurors") and were asked to explain their reasoning.
While 32% of death jurors stated that "the principle of an eye for an eye" was
"very" or "fairly" important to their punishment decision, a mere 1% stated
that "feelings of vengeance or revenge" were "very" important to their
decision, and only an additional 4% stated it was "fairly important,"' 28 the
vast majority (83%) of the jurors who voted for death stated that such
deterrence is quite weak. See generally John Donahue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of
Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REv. 791 (2005); Jeffrey Fagan,
Death and Deterrence Redux: Science, Law and Causal Reasoning on Capital Punishment, 4 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2007).
Nor can the death penalty be any more effective than life without parole at preventing a specific
defendant from committing another crime because either way the defendant is not getting back into
public-unless, of course, the future crime is in prison. The evidence shows, however, that
individuals convicted of murder are very unlikely to commit future violent crimes in prison. See
Mark D. Cunningham & Thomas J. Reidy, Don't Confuse Me with the Facts: Common Errors in
Violence Risk Assessment at Capital Sentencing, 26 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 20, 23-24 (1999)
(reporting longitudinal studies from several jurisdictions which show that the rate of assault by
death row, former death row, life without parole, and life with parole inmates is low); Thomas J.
Reidy et al., From Death to Life: Prison Behavior of Former Death Row Inmates in Indiana, 28
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 62, 65-68, 79 (2001) (reporting longitudinal studies from several
jurisdictions which show that the rate of assault by former death row inmates is low); see also John
F. Edens et al., Predictions of Future Dangerousness in Capital Murder Trials: Is It Time to
"Disinvent the Wheel?," 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 55, 76 (2005).
Thus, the 29% of death penalty supporters who cite cost or deterrence reasons might be
persuaded that their support is misguided; this assumes, of course, that they would not still favor the
death penalty based on the "moral balance" rationale that most supporters of capital punishment
cite. See infra notes 132-39 and accompanying text.
126. Jones, supra note 125, at 101.
127. Id.
128. The death jurors' response was even lower than jurors who served on life cases; among
life jurors, 14% cited such feelings. See supra note 25.
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feelings were "not at all" important. 129  In fact, the interviewed jurors
sometimes reacted with a hint of anger that a motive such as revenge could
be suggested, like the juror who objected to being asked if she had voted for
death because she thought the defendant "deserved" to die for his crime: "I
hate that word 'deserved.' It makes it sound like we voted for the [death]
sentence for some crazy vengeful reason."' 130
Yet while capital jurors strongly rejected the idea that "vengeance"
entered into their decision-making, both life and death jurors readily
identified factors important to their decision that an outside observer might
casually group under the rubric of "revenge" as the Gallup summary did.
Jurors on both death and life cases, for instance, identified as important to
their decision "a desire to see justice done" (91% describing the considera-
tion as "very or fairly important"), "feelings about what such crimes deserve"
(89%), "the vicious or brutal manner of killing" (81 %), "the pain and suffer-
ing of the victim" (64%), and "the loss and grief of [the] victim's family"
(61%).131 So how might capital jurors view these considerations as distinct
from revenge?
An important clue is that as strongly as jurors felt about the importance
of the crime and the victim to their decision, both life and death jurors just as
strongly rejected as important "the punishment wanted by members of the
community" (18% describing the factor as "very or fairly important"),
"community outrage over the crime" (17%), and "the punishment wanted by
the victim's family" (16%).132 In other words, most jurors when choosing a
sentence-whether they returned life or death-felt that they were acting not
to satisfy the community's anger or even the survivors' rage, but were trying
to, in some sense, "balance out" or "right" the wrong that had occurred. As
one would suspect, this was a difficult concept to capture in words (and one
reason that a ready label is elusive), but one juror's explanation of her vote
for death captured it fairly well: "I guess I was trying to find a balance. If
you take something, something should be put in its place to even it out .... I
found his crime to be abhorrent and I don't perceive prison as being the
worst thing in the world that can happen to someone. It just didn't seem like
an equal. It didn't seem to balance out that he was going to go on living."'1 33
Given that jurors are focused on asking whether the death penalty is
necessary in their case to restore the moral imbalance created by the murder,
it is not surprising then that jurors were especially attuned to the victim's role
in the crime. If jurors saw the victim as innocent and vulnerable, as in a case
129. See supra note 25 and infra note 130.
130. All jurors' quotes were obtained as part of the Capital Jury Project. See supra note 25.
The author has verified all of the quotations and statistics in this Article for accuracy against the
primary sources (i.e., the tape or interviewer's notes). To protect confidentiality, the author
maintains a file of all of the materials used in this Article.
131. See supra note 130.
132. See supra note 130.
133. See supra note 130.
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where the victim was randomly chosen by the defendant, they were far more
likely to favor a death sentence. 34 Indeed, jurors in random-victim cases
often saw themselves as advocates for the victim and viewed the imposition
of a death sentence on the defendant as a way to validate the victim's life and
address the injustice of the victim's death.
The lesson, therefore, is that while an outside observer might label
jurors' reasons as focused on "revenge," the jurors themselves view the
process differently. When asked why they imposed the death penalty, death
jurors would use a characterization such as "restoring moral balance" or
"providing justice" rather than revenge or retribution. (Jurors who voted for
life tended to use the same perspective, but in their cases saw the "moral
balance" as tipping toward a life sentence. 135) This attempt to describe more
fully the thought process and emotional responses of jurors who voted for
death sentences is not an effort to wade into the thicket of determining what
is a valid legal or philosophical justification for capital punishment.1 36
Justice Marshall in his Furman concurrence, for instance, maintained that
"retribution... is a goal that the legislature cannot constitutionally pursue as
its sole justification for capital punishment. ' 37 That is a question this Article
will leave for the constitutional scholars.
Justice Marshall also argued, however, that "no one has ever seriously
advanced retribution as a legitimate goal of our society. Defenses of capital
punishment are always mounted on deterrent or other similar theories .... I
cannot believe that at this stage in our history, the American people would
ever knowingly support purposeless vengeance."'' 38 On this score, it is not so
clear that Justice Marshall correctly captured what "the American people"
are reacting to when they support capital punishment either as an abstract
principle or in the jury room. Most of the general public no longer believes
that the death penalty deters,' 39 and in the jury room concern over general
134. See Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Empathy: The Problem of Worthy and
Unworthy Victims, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 343, 355-56 (2003) (providing data regarding the
sentences returned in cases involving random victims and contrasting them with cases involving
non-random victims).
135. See infra notes 168-73 and accompanying text.
136. For a thoughtful discussion of the role of retribution as a justification for the death penalty,
see generally Dan Markel, State, Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense of the Commutation of
Death Row and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407 (2005).
Professor Carol Steiker addresses the rationale of retribution and the death penalty in responding to
the argument that, if the death penalty deters, the state has a moral obligation to institute it. Carol S.
Steiker, No, Capital Punishment Is Not Morally Required: Deterrence, Deontology, and the Death
Penalty, 58 STAN. L. REv. 751 (2005) (critiquing Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital
Punishment Morally Required? Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REv. 703
(2005)).
137. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 363 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
138. Id.
139. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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deterrence plays a relatively minor role (only 32% of capital jurors stated it
was an important consideration to their decision). Rather, it appears that the
death penalty's resiliency does largely rest on the idea of "retribution," al-
though those who ascribe to this view would describe it with language such
as "restoring the moral balance" or "victim vindication" and contend that
Justice Marshall's phrase "purposeless vengeance" fails to capture the moral
issue at stake.
However one views the legitimacy of such a penological justification
for the death penalty, the reality appears to be that a certain category of cases
will be subject, at least for the foreseeable future, to what might be called
"the McVeigh Factor": the belief that certain crimes can be adequately
punished only by a sentence of death. And for those trying to understand the
operation of the death penalty, the McVeigh Factor helps explain why sup-
port for the death penalty remains high despite growing public anxieties over
capital punishment. One juror's explanation of his vote for death captured
this tension well, because despite expressing great doubts about capital
punishment, he still saw a death sentence as the proper punishment for the
defendant:
I'm as close to being against the death penalty as you can be without
being against it, meaning if there was an issue on the ballot abolishing
the death penalty, I'd vote against the death penalty. Do you want to
know why? Well, first of all I think it's applied unevenly by race.
Anything that has an unfair impact based on race is not a good thing,
especially when it comes to life and death. Second, there was this guy
on death row and some judge found the trial totally unfair. The guy
was almost executed and it was only through appeals he was released.
Luckily they kept appealing. This guy would have been dead and he's
innocent. So, anything that has a substantial chance of killing
innocent people, I don't think it's a great thing. But I think when
someone kills someone like in this case-a brutal, premeditated
murder with rape-that they've given up their right for life. I thought
this guy should get death, I thought "this is a death penalty case."
140
As this juror's comments reflect, certain cases will touch upon a core
belief that for many people will override even broad systemic concerns about
the death penalty and fairness. And as this juror's thoughts also make
evident, this belief is not limited to high-profile crimes like the Oklahoma
City bombing, but will apply whenever the individual believes that the taking
of the victim's life can only be morally redressed through the taking of the
defendant's life. 141
140. See supra notes 25, 130.
141. Indeed, the Capital Jury Project found that defense closing arguments often backfired if
they suggested to the jury that the defendant should be spared because the defendant was not on the
same level as murderers like McVeigh or Manson or Bundy. Jurors frequently took offense at what
they saw as the defense attorney's implicit suggestion that a victim's life was somehow worth less
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III. When the Micro-Factors and the McVeigh Factor Converge:
Implications for the Future of the Death Penalty
If the preceding picture of the current state of the death penalty both in
the courtroom and the arena of public opinion is accurate, it suggests that the
past decade's decline in death sentences is not a linear movement invariably
tugged further down each year by broad societal forces turning against the
death penalty. Rather, the picture that emerges is one of a capital punishment
system finally being subjected to checks after feeding off of poor lawyering,
unrepresentative juries, and unchecked prosecutorial discretion in the dec-
ades immediately following Gregg. This is a more complicated and messy
picture that carries with it the possibility that the decline in death sentences
brought about by procedural and systematic improvements may eventually
plateau once it reaches a baseline of cases controlled by the McVeigh Factor.
Indeed, those who oppose the death penalty might legitimately worry that the
reforms of late-such as the emergence of better lawyering, the abolition of
the juvenile death penalty, and the placing of mentally retarded defendants
outside the death penalty's reach-may actually serve to add legitimacy to
the remaining pool of death-eligible cases. 14 2 The risk, in other words, is that
the public may feel that the most unfair applications of the death penalty
have been banished 143 without realizing that more subtle but every bit as
deadly problems can still persist. 144 As abhorrent as sleeping lawyers are to
procedural fairness, they do catch the public's attention in a way that
statistical regressions cannot.
Whether opponents of the death penalty should be pessimistic, however,
is unclear. For even with the McVeigh Factor at work, and even if the past
decade's downward trend in death sentences has been largely attributable to a
merely because she was killed by someone who had not made front page news. See Sundby, supra
note 134, at 344-45, 367-69.
142. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 8, at 424 (recognizing the concern that reforms may
legitimate the death penalty but arguing that the problem must be addressed on an issue-by-issue
basis); see also Steiker & Steiker, supra note 13, at 436-37 (noting that the Supreme Court's
elaborate regulation of the death penalty has allowed "[t]he public [to] develop[] a strong but false
sense that many levels of safeguards protect against unjust or arbitrary executions").
143. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 8, at 421-22. The concerns generated by the type of
"reforms" discussed in this Article are more properly described as ones of "entrenchment" because
the "belief in the progress being made will ... induce at least some satisfaction... and thus, will
make people more comfortable... with the underlying practice, thereby dissipating continued
scrutiny of the death penalty and energy toward abolition." Id. at 424.
144. These would include problems such as poor lawyering that is not so mediocre that it falls
to the depths necessary to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel under the Court's Strickland v.
Washington standard. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text. Other persistent problems
include the variability in juries asked to make a moral decision, racial discrimination in jury
selection, racial bias in prosecutorial discretion, and the possibility of error even with forensic
evidence. For arguments highlighting the inherent procedural difficulties of eliminating
arbitrariness from the death penalty, see Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 613, 616-18 (2002)
(Breyer, J., concurring); SUNDBY, supra note 55, at 177-87; Sundby, supra note 81, at 56-57.
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complicated mix of micro-factors rather than to a grand sweeping turn
against the death penalty, the death penalty's future is not necessarily secure.
One can readily posit several plausible scenarios that would continue the de-
cline in death sentences and potentially lead to the elimination of the death
penalty.
A. Scenario One: A Wrongful Execution Against A Backdrop of "Soft"
Public Support
If forensic evidence eventually proves that an innocent person has been
executed, it could be the blockbuster type of event that becomes a catalyst for
a collapse of the death penalty. While a substantial majority of Americans
believes that an innocent person already has been executed, 45 the debate
over the death penalty tends to be sensitive to individual cases. The start of
the movement against the execution of mentally retarded defendants, for
example, is attributed to Georgia's execution of Jerome Bowden and the
ensuing public outcry. 146 As of now, however, the most recognizable "faces"
of the death penalty tend to be the individuals who represent the McVeigh
Factor--defendants like Timothy McVeigh, Ted Bundy, and Scott Peterson.
And while the public might say that they believe an innocent person has been
executed, at the moment they do not have a face to put with their belief. In-
dividual stories of injustice invariably carry far more emotional weight than
an abstract uneasiness that the system is not working properly-there is not,
if you will, a person for whom to name the "Factor" to counterbalance the
McVeigh Factor. 47
If a case emerges in which an innocent person has been executed, on the
other hand, the media coverage will be extensive and intense. While the im-
mediate repeal of death penalty statutes would be unlikely, forensic proof of
a wrongful execution might provide the push that moratorium movements
need to succeed. 48 A majority of Americans has already expressed general
support for a moratorium on executions until further studies can be
145. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
146. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313-14 & n.8 (2002) (describing the Bowden execution
and its effect on public opinion and legislative action).
147. Many thought that DNA tests performed on evidence in the case of Roger Coleman, an
individual executed by Virginia in 1992, might reveal a case of an innocent person being executed,
and the media attention leading up to the announcement of the results was extensive. The testing,
however, showed that the sperm in the victim was Coleman's. Kristen Gelineau, DNA Affirms
Dead Man 's Guilt: Killer Had Professed Innocence Until His Execution in 1992, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Jan. 13, 2006, at 40.
148. On the other hand, without a significant precipitating event, many legislatures appear
unlikely to implement moratoria. See, e.g., State Officials Unfazed by Death Penalty Criticism,
ATLANTA J. CONST., Feb. 25, 2006, at B2 (describing "little interest" in a moratorium despite an
ABA report detailing problems with Georgia's death penalty system and calling for a moratorium);
Adam Tanner, Liberal California Backs Death Penalty, REUTERS, Mar. 3, 2006, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Reuters File (reporting that "a California moratorium proposal has stalled").
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completed. 149 In some states, public support for a moratorium has at points
even exceeded support for the death penalty; in California, for example, a
2000 Field Poll found that although 63% favored the death penalty, 73% fa-
vored a moratorium "until a study of fairness [is done]" and only 17%
opposed it.15° New Jersey recently passed a moratorium by wide margins in
its legislature.15 1 Given that significant public support for a moratorium al-
ready exists and that an increasing number of judges, law enforcement
personnel, and prosecutors are publicly lending support to the movement, 152 a
documented case of a wrongful execution might create pressures that would
trigger a widespread suspension of executions without political
repercussions; in Illinois, for instance, 68% supported Governor Ryan's
suspension of executions in light of the state's well-documented problems
with the death penalty.1
53
The key question in this scenario is whether the short-term measure of
moratoria would eventually ripen into de facto abolition or whether a
movement would eventually arise to lift these moratoria. 154 This is a difficult
question to answer, but while the polls show fairly strong support for the
death penalty in the abstract, that support also must be put in context, and
149. THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 2001, supra note 124, at 94; Gary Langer, Death
Penalty Ambivalence: Poll Points to Support for Execution Moratorium in U.S., ABCNEWS.COM,
May 2, 2001, http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/pollO10504_deathpenalty.html
(reporting 51% support for a national moratorium).
150. MARK DICAMILLO & MERVIN FIELD, FIELD RESEARCH CORP., SIGNIFICANT DECLINE IN
ONCE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY SUPPORT FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THREE OUT OF FOUR
FAVOR GOVERNOR DAVIS DECLARING A DEATH PENALTY MORATORIUM (2000), available at
http://field.com/fieldpollonline/subscribers/Release1965.pdf. The most recent Field poll again
found 63% of respondents in favor of the death penalty, although the poll did not ask about support
for a moratorium. MARK DICAMILLO & MERVIN FIELD, FIELD RESEARCH CORP., WHILE STILL
STRONGLY SUPPORTING THE DEATH PENALTY, CALIFORNIANS HAVE MIXED VIEWS ON SOME
ASPECTS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: MAJORITY OPPOSES THE DELAY IN THE MORALES EXECUTION
(2006), available at http://field.com/fieldpollonline/subscribers/RLS2183.pdf.
151. Angela Delli Santi, Death Penalty: Legislators Back Suspension, Study, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Jan. 10, 2006, at B 1, available at 2006 WLNR 496491.
152. See, e.g., Death Penalty Info. Ctr., California Moratorium Bill Gains Broad Support from
Law Enforcement, Prosecutors and Judges (Jan. 9, 2006),
http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=1663; Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Eight Former North
Carolina Supreme Court Justices Call on the General Assembly for an Immediate Vote on the
Moratorium Bill (June 29, 2004), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did= 1051.
153. Kevin McDermott, Support Holds for Gov. Ryan's Moratorium on Death Penalty: Two-
Thirds in Poll Back the Freeze, but Equal Numbers Reject His Leadership, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Aug. 25, 2002, at A12. Support for Governor Ryan's later decision to grant clemency to
all death row inmates, on the other hand, was almost evenly split. See Kevin McDermott,
Illinoisans Are Split Closely on Ryan's Commutations, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 7, 2003, at
Al (finding that 50.55% opposed and 47.5% supported granting clemency).
154. In Illinois, for instance, the future of the moratorium now appears in doubt absent new
developments. See Carlos Sadovi, On Death Penalty, the Debate Is Over Time, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 27,
2006, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/elections/chi-0602270220feb27,1,4989789.story




indications are that the depth of support may not be that great. To begin
with, a significant majority (57%) of those who say they support the death
penalty also state that they do so with "reservations. 155 These reservations
are of course consistent with the polls that find support for moratoria and the
polls that show that a significant percentage of Americans believe that an
innocent person has been executed and that minority and poor defendants are
more likely to receive a sentence of death.
156
Polls also show that abstract support for the death penalty falls if
respondents are given a choice of life without parole. Over the past five
years when the Gallup Poll has asked, "If you could choose between the fol-
lowing two approaches, which do you think is the better penalty for
murder-the death penalty or life with absolutely no possibility of parole?,"
on average 53% chose death and 43% picked life. 157 These are significant
drops from those same polls' results when respondents were simply asked if
they favored (71%) or opposed (25%) the death penalty. 158 This difference
suggests that the McVeigh Factor weakens considerably when Americans are
given the choice of life without parole, although it should be noted that a
majority still favors death, indicating that the McVeigh Factor-the belief
that the death penalty is the only proper punishment for certain crimes-is at
work.
Perhaps most importantly, since under this scenario the decision is
ultimately a political one, the death penalty appears to have lost some of its
power as an issue that decides elections. Thus, while a majority of voters
might favor the death penalty in the abstract, the issue may not have the
"third rail" effect that politicians once feared.
159
The most recent gubernatorial election in Virginia may serve as a
harbinger for the future. The state has strong popular support for the death
penalty, and as the election neared, the Republican candidate ran ads using
the Democratic candidate's personal opposition to the death penalty as a
wedge issue.' 60 The Democratic candidate, while pledging to enforce the
155. Jeffrey M. Jones, Slim Majority ofAmericans Think Death Penalty Applied Fairly in This
Country, THE GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, June 2000, at 64, 65.
156. See supra notes 36, 116-17 and accompanying text.
157. The averages are based on the results of polls taken on the following dates: Feb. 19-2 1,
2001; May 10-14, 2001; May 6-9, 2002; May 5-7, 2003; May 2-4, 2004; May 2-5, 2005. See
Moore, supra note 119, at 226. The averages have been rounded to the nearest whole number.
158. Id. The averages are based on the results of polls taken on the same dates as listed in note
157. The averages have been rounded to the nearest whole number.
159. Michael Dukakis's answer in the presidential debates to a question about the death
penalty, for example, was perceived as disastrous because it showed him to be unemotional and out
of touch with public sentiment on the death penalty. Edward Walsh, Dukakis Adds Emotion to
Death-Penalty Answer; Cool Response in Debate Dismayed Aides, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 1988, at
A23 (describing Dukakis's answer to a hypothetical question posed during the presidential debate
asking whether Dukakis would seek the death penalty for a person accused of raping and murdering
Dukakis's wife, Kitty, as "one of [the] most damaging moments in... the presidential campaign").
160. Robert Barnes, Kilgore Ads Seek to Divide Democrats, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2005, at Al.
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death penalty, had acknowledged his personal and religious opposition to
capital punishment.161  Although in part because they were seen as too
negative, the death penalty ads backfired; a poll found that 25% of those who
had seen the ads were less likely to vote for the Republican candidate and
only 10% were more likely.162 One conservative pundit, in trying to explain
why the death penalty issue did not gain traction in the Virginia campaign,
offered the observation that the death penalty was "an issue that is so early
1990s, when crime really was high on the agenda-it's not that important
now."' 163 Voter concern over crime as an election issue, therefore, appears to
have fallen along with the drop in the violent-crime rate over the same period
of time. Voters in the 2005 Virginia governor's election were far more con-
cerned with education (21% identifying it as the most important issue), taxes
and spending (17%), and transportation (15%), than with crime (7%).'64
If politicians come to see the public's support for the death penalty as
"soft," even if the abstract numbers are relatively high, it would make any
effort to re-initiate the death penalty after a moratorium far more difficult.
When cutting taxes is higher on the voters' agenda than crime, a legislative
vote to bring back the death penalty might not be a top political priority.
And the findings that would come out of a moratorium to guard against fu-
ture wrongful executions would no doubt push the already hefty price tag of
the death penalty even higher, as costly procedural safeguards would need to
be implemented to prevent another wrongful execution. Moreover, this
higher price tag would fund a system that would probably make at most a
handful of defendants eligible for the death penalty once requirements such
as the necessity of forensic proof of guilt are instituted. 65 Either as a matter
of election politics or as a legislative budgetary judgment,' 66 the political will
to bring back the death penalty under these circumstances might be lacking.
161. Id.
162. Warren Fiske, Kilgore Not Aided in Poll by Death Penalty Ads, VIRGINIAN-PILOT
(Norfolk, Va.), Oct. 24, 2005, at B4.
163. All Things Considered: Bush's Battles and the Off-Year Election (NPR radio broadcast,
Nov. 11, 2005), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5009541
(quoting Richard Lowry, editor of National Review).
164. Fiske, supra note 162.
165. For instance, the Massachusetts Governor's Council on Capital Punishment proposed the
"creation of a fair capital punishment statute that is as narrowly tailored, and as infallible, as
humanly possible." JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN ET AL., GOVERNOR'S COUNCIL ON CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT, FINAL REPORT 3 (2004), available at http://www.mass.gov/Agov2/docs/5-3-
04%20MassDPReportFinal.pdf. The statute's requirements of scientific proof, when coupled with
the small number of factors that would make a defendant death-eligible, would probably produce a
handful of possible capital cases a year. See Franklin E. Zinring, Symbol and Substance in the
Massachusetts Commission Report, 80 IND. L.J. 115, 120 (2005) (questioning whether "there has
been any single case in Massachusetts in the last four or five years that would meet the [proposed
law's] criteria").
166. See Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
1276, 1285-99 (2005) (explaining the role that budgetary concerns play in legislative decisions
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Importantly, this scenario does not depend on the McVeigh Factor
fading away. In fact, polls would probably show continued support for the
death penalty even as it fell into disuse. The international experience,
however, demonstrates that support for the death penalty in the abstract does
not necessarily translate into the practice becoming law. Sometimes, as with
countries abolishing the death penalty to gain entrance into the European
Union, a tradeoff can occur to achieve larger political goals despite the need
to abolish practices that maintain popular support. 167 In the United States, a
circumstance like a wrongful execution might spark such a tradeoff because
the costs of re-instituting an "improved" death penalty could be so high that
it would not be seen as economically or politically wise.
B. Scenario Two: Capital Punishment's "Death by a Thousand Cuts"
The previous scenario describes a situation in which a major event
triggers a nationwide state-by-state movement that politically overrides the
McVeigh Factor's influence. Another possible scenario exists that results in
abolition of the death penalty for similar political considerations but is based
on a continued chipping away at the death sentencing rate. This scenario
assumes that the McVeigh Factor will remain in effect, but proceeds on the
premise that the number of cases in which a death-qualified jury would
always return a death sentence is very small.
Remember that jurors who voice a "moral justice" rationale for the
death penalty generally cast the rationale as one of "balance." That is, the
murder created a moral imbalance and the punishment must "fit" the
circumstances in such a way that the balance is restored. For most jurors,
however, the idea of balance also encompassed the idea that the whole of a
case must be considered in deciding just what sentence "fits" the crime and
can restore the balance. 168 Not surprisingly, then, many of the jurors who
voted for life sentences also spoke in terms of balance in trying to decide
what the defendant "deserved" and which punishment "fit" the crime. In
regarding sentencing reform and policies); Darryl K. Brown, Rethinking Overcriminalization 36-37
(ExpressO Preprint Series, Working Paper No. 995, 2006), available at
http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/995 (noting that legislatures can use the budget process to limit
enforcement of criminal laws).
167. See Nora V. Demleitner, The Death Penalty in the United States: Following the European
Lead?, 81 OR. L. REV. 131, 138-39 & n.49 (2002) (describing Turkey's willingness to suspend the
death penalty to gain admission to the European Union); Joshua Micah Marshall, Death in Venice,
NEW REPUBLIC, July 31, 2000, at 12 (pointing out that abolition of the death penalty in most
European countries was accomplished despite broad popular support). But see Laurence R. Helfer,
Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean
Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832, 1886-87 (2002) (describing
the backlash in Caribbean Commonwealth countries and their withdrawal from an international
human rights tribunal in part because of rulings restricting capital punishment in the face of strong
popular support).
168. As noted earlier, however, some jurors were not open to the idea of balancing because,
from their view, once an intentional murder was proven a death sentence was morally required. See
supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
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fact, life jurors were just as concerned "about what such crimes deserve"
(87% stated that the consideration was "very" or "fairly" important to their
punishment decision) as death jurors (90%).169 And "the desire to see justice
done" was equally important to the life jurors (91% described it as "very" or
"fairly" important) as the death jurors (91%).170
The critical difference in the life cases was that the defense was able to
convince the jury that the defendant's life story was one that deserved its
own weight on the moral balancing scales and tipped the scales to life. 171 In
most cases, the defense's placement of a moral weight on the scales in favor
of life took the form of demonstrating to the jury that the defendant's life was
one where he had never had a real opportunity to take the "high road.' '172 If
able to convince the jury that the defendant's life itself was a circumstance
arguing for the "moral" outcome of a life sentence, defense attorneys were
able to obtain life sentences even in cases with horrifying facts like torture
murders and multiple victims. 173
The fact that many jurors bring to the jury box a "moral balancing"
view, therefore, does not necessarily dictate that a murder case will end in a
death sentence. Even a case with egregious facts like the Oklahoma City
bombing can have additional facts that, if persuasively presented, may turn a
jury to life. Terry Nichols, after all, was spared the death penalty not once,
but twice, because twelve jurors were unable to agree that his level of par-
ticipation warranted the same sentence as Timothy McVeigh. 174 That juries
have decided to return life sentences even in cases that at first blush appear to
be very strong candidates for a death sentence suggests that one must go
fairly deep into the pool of death-eligible cases before hitting the McVeigh
Factor.
If the hypothesis that ultimately the McVeigh Factor will control only a
small number of cases is correct, then further downward movement in death
sentences is still possible even though the annual total has been slipping
toward one hundred. Moreover, although this process might initially be
marked only by an incremental annual downward movement, over time a
slow but steady rate of decline in the number of death sentences could even-
tually have a snowball effect. For if the number of death sentences continues
to drop, and especially if prosecutors are witnessing juries refusing to return
169. See supra notes 128-35 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 128-35 and accompanying text.
171. First, though, the defense must have satisfied the jury that the defendant posed no realistic
future danger if allowed to live--every capital jury saw its foremost duty as ensuring that the
defendant would never kill again. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
172. SUNDBY, supra note 55, at 140-41.
173. Id. at 133-59 (describing the case of George Brown).
174. Hung Jury Spares Nichols A Second Time from Death, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2004, at A7,
available at 2004 WLNR 5460461 (reporting that the jurors in the state proceeding against Terry
Nichols deadlocked regarding the sentencing, just as a federal jury had done six years earlier).
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death sentences in cases that appear to be strong candidates for death, prose-
cutors will become all the more cautious in pursuing death sentences except
in extreme cases like Timothy McVeigh's.
The effect may then end up like that in the first scenario, even if it takes
longer to reach it: a death penalty so rarely implemented that it can no longer
support the tradeoffs in terms of cost and the tremendous demands a death
case makes on the criminal justice system. And if the demise of capital
punishment should ultimately come through juries refusing to return death
sentences in all but the rarest instances, it would not be the first time jury
behavior has altered the death penalty's path. The turning away from a man-
datory death penalty, for instance, is largely attributed to the refusal of juries
to convict manifestly guilty defendants because they did not believe that the
defendant deserved a death sentence. 
175
For those opposed to the death penalty, therefore, this second scenario
offers hope even without a blockbuster event. That optimism must be tem-
pered by the understanding that its outcome depends on the continued
progress of the micro-factors that were identified earlier and on an under-
standing that life sentences are obtained on a case-by-case basis. For
although the number of death sentences may not yet have dwindled to only
those subject to the McVeigh Factor, the cases in which prosecutors are still
actively seeking death sentences are likely to be among the more shocking
murders. To win life sentences in those cases, capital defense lawyers will
have to become all the more adept at promoting those factors already at work
that create plea bargains for life or that help provide the critical threshold
votes for life if the case goes to trial.
Finally, of course, there are likely to be new micro-factors that in the
future may cause cases to switch over from "death" to "life" (and remember,
to have an impact on the aggregate number of death sentences these factors
need not influence a large number of cases or, at the jury level, a large
number of jurors). For example, several more cases a year may end up as life
that would have gone death because of the expanding role of "defense-based
victim outreach," an effort to establish contact with the victim's survivors to
find ways to provide the survivors a sense of closure without seeking a
sentence of death. 
176
175. Hugo Adam Bedau, Background and Developments, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA
9-11 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 3d ed. 1982).
176. See e.g., Tammy Krause, Reaching Out to the Other Side: Defense-Based Victim
Outreach, in WouNDs THAT Do NOT BIND: VICTIM-BASED PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEATH
PENALTY 379, 388-93 (James A. Acker & David R. Karp eds., 2006). While contacting the
victims' relatives can sometimes lead the prosecution to not seek the death penalty if the relatives
do not want capital punishment, it also can play an important role even if the case goes to trial.
After Zacarias Moussaoui had been convicted for his role in the 9/11 tragedy, for instance, and the
prosecution was seeking the death penalty, the defense called a number of victims' survivors as
witnesses, many of whom had approached the defense after learning that the defense was attempting
to reach out to relatives of the victims. See, e.g., Jerry Markon & Timothy Dwyer, Moussaoui Gets
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IV. Conclusion
The scenarios outlined above are, of course, only two possibilities out of
a number of potential outcomes, many of which do not end in abolition.
Those who study the death penalty quickly learn that predicting the future
course of an institution that is so subject to the volatility of contemporary
events is a hazardous undertaking at best. One major event, like proof that
an innocent man was executed, might start a chain reaction that leads to
abolition. On the other hand, a sharp rise in the murder rate or a string of
terrorist attacks might lead to a reversal of the decline in death sentences.
Still, despite the volatility, the steady decline in death sentences over the past
decade suggests that capital punishment may be at another crossroads and it
is worthwhile to try and discern what factors are at work.
177
This close look at what has happened with the decline in death penalty
sentences over the past decade contains mixed news for the death penalty's
opponents. The good news is that a "ground up" battle to curtail the death
penalty is possible. The significant decline in death sentences over the past
decade was primarily accomplished not through major court rulings that
swept large categories of death penalty cases off the table, but through a
case-by-case battle in the courtroom and an issue-by-issue campaign in the
legislatures. Those advocating the abolition of the death penalty for mentally
retarded defendants and juvenile offenders, for example, did not win their
victories when the Supreme Court finally handed down Atkins and Simmons;
rather, their real victories were won during the previous decade as juries,
legislatures, and public opinion gradually turned against those practices.
7 8
Indeed, the past decade's decline in death sentences appears to be primarily
attributable not to a broad renewed public debate over the death penalty, but
to the operation of a number of micro-factors-such as improved capital rep-
resentation and more representative juries-that each worked to take some
cases out of the "death" category and move them over to "life." Together
these micro-factors have had a noticeable and important impact on the de-
cline in death sentences.
The less encouraging news for opponents is that although death
sentences have steadily fallen over the past decade, the decline does not
appear to indicate any broad turning against the death penalty by the
American public. In fact, general support for the death penalty remains
Some Unusual Help: Some 9/11 Relatives Testify for Defense, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 2006, at A10.
The jury ultimately returned a life sentence, and the relatives' testimony for the defense may have
acted as an important emotional counterweight to the powerful testimony of the survivors who
earlier had testified for the prosecution at the penalty phase.
177. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 13, at 417 ("For the first time in several decades, across the
United States, we stand at a moment of critical appraisal of our practice of capital punishment.").
178. Moreover, since these practices were banished because public support had turned against
them, the Court's decisions produced no significant public backlash.
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relatively high and is likely to stay there because of an abiding belief that
certain crimes, like those committed by Timothy McVeigh, deserve only the
death penalty. The strength of that support may be somewhat soft, but absent
a major event like DNA proof that an innocent person was executed, contin-
ued erosion in the number of death sentences will in all likelihood depend
upon the same strategy of the past decade: case-by-case battles in the court-
rooms and issue-by-issue struggles in the legislatures. Eventually it may be
that imposition of the death penalty will become so rare that it will no longer
make political or economic sense to maintain the institution of capital
punishment. 7 9 To reach that day, though, death penalty opponents should be
prepared to "think small," at least in the short term, and to focus on the
micro-factors that will continue to move cases one by one from a sentence of
death to a sentence of life.
179. The rare imposition of death sentences, especially if coupled with states rarely carrying out
executions, also would give added credence to an argument that the death penalty will have become
cruel and unusual in practice. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Abolition in Our Time, 1
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 323, 338-39 (2003) (commenting on the use of low execution rates to form an
argument that the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment).
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